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Abstract
The United Kingdom (UK) reported record employment levels following its
vote to Leave the European Union (EU), leading to many pundits discarding
the dire pre-Brexit vote impact assessments as part of “project fear.” This
paper studies the cost of the Brexit-vote to date across UK regions finding
significant evidence suggesting that the economic costs of the Brexit-vote are
both sizable and far from evenly distributed. Among 382 districts, at least 168
districts appear to be Brexit-vote losers, having lost, on average 8.54 percent-
age points of output in 2018 compared to their respective synthetic controls.
The Brexit-vote costs are increasing in a districts: a) support for Leave in 2016;
b) the size of its manufacturing sector; c) the share of low skilled. The Brexit-
vote induced economic divergence across regions is already exacerbating the
regional economic inequalities that the 2016 EU referendum vote made appar-
ent. Indirect evidence further suggests that firms may, amidst the significant
(trade) policy uncertainty, have shifted away from capital to labor in the short-
term given that Brexit has, to date, not led to changes in market access. The
resulting short-term employment- and payroll growth post-2016 is not sup-
ported by productivity increases in most parts of the UK. This sets up the
possibility for significant labor market adjustments once Brexit becomes a de-
facto reality. Further, there is some evidence suggesting that COVID19 may
exacerbate the regional economic impact of the Brexit-vote to date.
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1 Introduction
An overwhelming majority of economists would agree with the statement that
the Brexit-vote has left the United Kingdom (UK) with worse growth prospects
going forward. Evidence of the economic impact of the Brexit-vote to date suggests
that since 2016, the UK has lost around 2.5% of annual output (see Born et al., 2019;
Springford, 2019). Firms and households unwillingness to commit investment in
the UK seems to be a primary driver of the cost of Brexit-vote to date, despite
Brexit still not being a de-facto reality more than four years after the vote. This
paper is a first attempt to shed light on the regional economic distribution of the
costs of Brexit up to 2019Q3 – the most recent date for which subnational data on
economic activity is broadly available.
We follow Born et al. (2019) in leveraging a synthetic control method approach
to estimate the economic impact of the Brexit vote for each of the UK’s 12 regions
using quarterly data up to 2019 Q3 and, for each of the UK’s 382 local authority
districts using annual data available up to 2018. Bearing in mind the challenges
that working with a relatively short panel of low frequency data (annual) data
have for the validity of synthetic control estimates (Abadie, 2020), we construct
a total of more than 100 different synthetic control estimates for each district and
leverage ensemble methods as suggested by Athey et al. (2019). This allows us to
arrive at a district-level estimate of the output losses attributable to Brexit to date.
A simulation approach complements the analysis and aims to address specific
concerns about potential overfitting due to a mechanically exploding donor pool
when invoking subnational data produces very similar results.
Using quarterly data across the UK’s regions, we find that nearly all regions
have lost economic activity vis-a-vis their respective synthetic controls. In relative
terms, by 2019, the West Midlands (-5.29 percent), Northern Ireland (-4.67 percent),
the South West (-3.5 percent) and South East (-3.08 percent) appear to have lost
most in relative terms, highlighting that economic divergence between the UK’s
regions may be exacerbated by Brexit. In absolute terms, the economic impact of
the Brexit-vote so far appears largest in London and the South East. Aggregated
up, our results match quite well the UK-wide estimates of the cost of Brexit-vote
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to date by Born et al. (2019).
Turning to the analysis of annual district-level data available up to 2018, the re-
sults suggests that by 2018, among the 382 districts of the UK, 255 districts record
a 2018 Gross value added that is smaller compared to their synthetic control –
while half as many, 127 districts, report a higher value for 2018 compared to their
synthetic control. Around 168 districts can be labelled as “Brexit-vote losers” –
these are districts that very consistently exhibit lower levels of output relative to
their respective synthetic controls across a host of estimates. Only a small number
of 78 districts are classified as relatively clear “Brexit-vote winners” with the re-
maining districts exhibiting patterns that are are too ambiguous to assign a label.
On average, districts classified as “Brexit-vote losers”, by 2018, exhibit output that
is, on average, 8.54 percentage points lower compared to their respective synthetic
controls. The small subset of “Brexit winners” exhibit , on average, 6.54 percent-
age points higher output relative to their respective synthetic controls. The overall
aggregated-up Brexit-vote losses again, compare very well with the estimates ob-
tained from the region-level analysis as well as country-wide studies. This high-
lights that the estimates are not sensitive to the specific choice of the donor pool;
the specific geographic aggregation of the data; or the specific data set we study.
The economic costs of the Brexit-vote are far from evenly distributed across
the UK’s regions. A regression analysis of the covariates of the Brexit-vote in-
duced output losses suggests that the “Brexit-vote costs” are more concentrated
in districts with sizable manufacturing sector employment and value added – a
finding that is not surprising given that this sector is very reliant on frictionless
trade with the EU’s single market and is integrated in its just-in-time supply chains
(Berlingieri et al., 2019; Pisch, 2020). The results further suggest that areas that had
higher support for Leave have experienced significantly lower levels of economic
growth relative to their respective synthetic control units. Further, Brexit-costs ap-
pear concentrated in regions with a higher share of residents with relatively low
qualifications. Overall, the results suggest that the cost of the Brexit-vote up to
2018 may significantly exacerbate regional inequalities that became particularly
apparent in the 2016 EU Referendum vote patterns (Becker et al., 2017).
Further, we present some evidence that may shed light on the underlying eco-
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nomic mechanisms that may nevertheless help understand why the UK recorded
record employment levels post 2016. Much of the focus of the literature studying
the impacts of the Brexit-vote so far highlight the importance of uncertainty over
the future trading relationship between the UK and Europe. This work anchors
around models of economic behavior in which firms or consumers are forward
looking agents that form expectations about the macroeconomy (see Coibion et al.,
2019; Fuster et al., 2010, 2012; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, 2015a,b; Coibion
et al., 2018; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011 for some related literature). This un-
certainty is still not resolved as Brexit, while becoming a de-jure reality in January
2020, is not a de-facto economic reality with negotiations for the future trading
relationship – under the threat of a No Deal exit from January 2021 – yet to be con-
cluded. In this setting, unsurprisingly, firms may have been holding off long term
capital investments, which may come with some fixed costs and be only partially
irreversible, and rather substitute towards labor that can be more easily adjusted
in case an unfavorable Brexit deal becomes an economic reality. Such substitution
away from capital to labor may help explain the record levels of employment post
2016 in the UK.1 One way to gauge whether this type of substitution did indeed
occur is by studying productivity. Firms, by holding off on investing in capital,
were not keeping optimal capital-to-labour ratios. This should result in lower la-
bor productivity – which should be more concentrated in areas that saw the biggest
drop in output vis-a-vis their synthetic controls. This is an observation we indeed
can document: while almost consistently, employment levels increased across dis-
tricts in the UK – irrespective of whether a district appears to be a Brexit-winner
or a Brexit-loser – output per worker significantly declined, in particular in the
regions with the largest gap vis-a-vis their respective synthetic controls. The tem-
porary substitution away from capital to labor sets up the possibility for dramatic
employment adjustments once a hard Brexit may become economic reality.
Lastly, we also document some tentative evidence that suggests that the eco-
nomic impact from Brexit to date, may be exacerbated by significant output adjust-
ments that may take place due to COVID19. Districts that saw the most notable
1See for a similar argument made in Faccini and Palombo (2019); Broadbent et al. (2019) high-
light that the devaluation of the pound may have provided an additional temporary cushion.
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drops in output relative to their synthetic control due to the Brexit-vote to date
see significantly higher levels of workers being furloughed. For every one per-
centage point higher gap between a district and its synthetic control, capturing
the Brexit cost to date, the share of employments furloughed are 0.15 percentage
points higher, suggesting that these districts may be more severely hit if a sizable
share of furloughed employments are being lost.
Our findings complement much of the economic literature that has highlighted
that there are indeed, good reasons to believe that the economic impact of Brexit
will not be evenly spread. Multiple studies conducted before and in the wake of
the EU referendum vote suggest that cost of Brexit will be highly heterogenous
across the UK’s nations and even across regions. Los et al. (2017) suggest that re-
gions that voted strongly for Brexit are expected to be among those that are more
economically dependent on EU markets, and that are more likely to be negatively
affected by Brexit. Borchert and Tamberi (2018) suggests that Brexit shocks may
cause an adverse economic impact on the North East and the Midlands because
these are the regions that export the most to EU markets. Focusing on manufactur-
ing specifically, Gasiorek et al. (2018) conduct an ex-ante impact modelling finding
that Brexit is more likely to negatively affect regions that depend on manufac-
turing the most. HM Government (2018) extensive modelling point to significant
spatial heterogeneity of the impact of different new trade regimes coming into
place that may exacerbate regional inequalities. The analysis considers sectoral
specialisation and the fact that the economic impacts can flow between regions
due to integrated supply chains. Analysis conducted by Cambridge Econometrics
(2018) suggests that a change in trading regime with the EU will induce a slowing
down of growth across the UK but to a lesser degree for London and the South
East. Oliver Wyman (2018), focusing on consumption and income, suggest that
Brexit has notably heterogenous impacts across household across regions. Dhin-
gra et al. (2017) estimate economic consequences of leaving the European Union
for living standards in the UK by estimating the welfare effects of changes in trade
and fiscal transfers following Brexit. They find static losses range between 1.28%
and 2.61% of welfare
Levell and Keiller (2018) find that some industries (e.g. transport equipment)
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are more likely to adversely affected by potential trade barriers. In regions that are
largely dependent on these industries, low-educated workers may find it especially
difficult to adapt to new conditions. Chen et al. (2018) compares the economic
exposure to Brexit on regions in the UK and Europe finding that the UK regions
will be most affected. Clarke et al. (2017) suggest that London and the South
East may be least affected by negative consequences of new tariff and non-tariff
barriers. Similar to Clarke et al. (2017), Morris (2018) suggest that London and the
South East are least likely to be badly affected by Brexit. In terms of price impacts,
areas outside London are more likely to be affected by a hard Brexit. The findings
from this paper, with evidence up to 2018, suggest that in relative terms, the West
Midlands, Northern Ireland, and the South West are most affected by Brexit to
date. These findings are quite consistent with Dhingra et al. (2018), who found
that areas in the South of England, and urban areas, are predicted to be harder hit
by Brexit under both a hard- and a soft-Brexit scenario.
Much of the existing work has purely focused on ex-ante impact modelling as
Brexit only became a legal reality in January 2020, more than three-and-a-half years
after the EU referendum, with a change in the actual trading regime only becom-
ing effective, potentially from January 2021 after the end of the transition period.
Our work complements several strands studying the regional economic impact
of the Brexit-vote to date. This is related to a larger strand of literature that has
attempted to study the economic impact of Brexit to date through a host of mecha-
nisms. Steinberg (2017) suggests, using a dynamic general equilibrium model, that
the Brexit may have reduced welfare of UK households is 0.4-1.2 percent lower
with a non-neglible share of this cost being attributable to Brexit-induced trade
policy uncertainty. Broadbent et al. (2019) highlight that the depreciation of the
pound in the wake of the Brexit vote in 2016 created a temporary positive windfall
for exporters which may have had a positive temporary effect on local economies.
Breinlich et al. (2020) study foreign direct investment (FDI), using a synthetic con-
trol approach, finding that the 2016 Brexit vote had a sizable impact decreasing
FDI projects of EU27 member countries in the UK. At the same time, the UK saw
a notable increase in outflowing FDI into the EU27. McGrattan and Waddle (2020)
use simulations from a multi-country neoclassical growth model to analyze several
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post-Brexit scenarios finding significant heterogeneity of the impacts depending on
the policy response of multinational firms. Breinlich et al. (2017) highlight how the
surge in consumer prices, driven by the devaluation of the pound in the wake of
the Brexit vote, has significantly depressed real incomes and negatively affected
consumer spending. This paper adds to and complements the existing literature
which, to date, has not studied the regional economic implications of Brext-vote to
date – apart from through ex-ante economic impact modelling.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the varia-
tions around the synthetic control method used along with the subnational data
we leverage; Section 3 presents the results across UK regions; Section 4 presents
the main district-level estimates, decomposes the variation and discusses the un-
derlying mechanism. The last section concludes.
2 Method
In this paper we estimate the region-specific cost of Brexit to date. To do
this, we leverage on the synthetic control method as introduced by Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) (see also Abadie et al. (2015, 2010)). In the context of Brexit,
Born et al. (2019) estimate a synthetic control at the country level and documents
that Brexit until the end of 2018 has cost the UK economy between 1.7-2.5 percent
of GDP. Their careful analysis is, however, silent on the regional distribution of
this output loss across different parts of the UK – this paper fills this gap.
2.1 Data
UK subnational economic activity We leverage two data sources that capture
the UK’s subnational economic activity. First, we draw on experimental high fre-
quency subnational real GDP measures. This data is available for England and
Wales from the ONS2, while Scotland3 and Northern Ireland4 produce their own
2This data can be accessed here https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/
grossdomesticproductgdp/datasets/quarterlycountryandregionalgdp, 24.06.2020.
3The Scottish Data is available here https://www.gov.scot/publications/
gdp-quarterly-national-accounts-for-scotland-2019-q4/, accessed 25.06.2020.
4The Northern Irish data is available here https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/
economic-output-statistics/ni-composite-economic-index, accessed 25.06.2020.
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estimates. These data are not classified as Official Statistics but have been pro-
duced as experimental statistics at quarterly cadence for each of the UK’s fourteen
regions capturing the UK’s twelve NUTS1 regions. The data are available from
2012Q1 up to 2019Q3. The combined data set represents the UK as 12 spatial units
over 31 time periods.
We further leverage annual subnational economic data from 2000 up to 2018
measuring regional gross value added.5 The most recent release was published on
19 December 2019 covering data up to 2018. These data are classified as National
Statistics, according to the Code of Practice for official statistics. The data measure
estimates of balanced gross value added (GVA), allocated to local authorities in
the UK on a workplace basis – that is, value added is attributed to the location of
where economic activity takes place. We rely on the data that provides GVA in real
terms using chained volume measures with values expressed in 2016 money value.
The data are reported for each of the UK’s 382 districts (using district boundaries
as of January 2019) since 2000.
Donor pool data In order to construct synthetic control estimates of real GDP’s
evolution across the UK’s regions and districts, we rely on multiple data sources.
Specifically, for the analysis of quarterly data that we can construct for each of
the 12 regions for which the UK data provide us with regional economic activ-
ity estimates, we naturally rely on donor pool data that is reported at the same
frequency. We leverage real GDP data as reported in quarterly national accounts
data collected by the Economists Intelligence Unit (EIU), which is mostly available
only for a subset of countries. We put specific emphasis on data from the G20, the
OECD and the EU economies in particular. The quarterly data is mostly available
up until the end of 2019.
For the construction of annual estimates we rely on data from the EIU, the Eu-
ropean Statistical Office (Eurostat), and the US’s Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). We leverage both national- and subnational data for the annual estimates
(very few countries – the UK is an exception producing experimental statistics –
5This data is available here https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/
bulletins/regionaleconomicactivitybygrossdomesticproductuk/1998to2018, 24.06.2020.
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produce high frequency subnational economic accounts). The annual data from
the Economists Intelligence Unit provides economic indicators for 204 countries,
ranging from 1980 to 2019. We use real gross domestic product (GDP) data be-
tween 2000 and 2018 to construct the donor pools: G20, OECD, and EU, covering
18, 33, and 27 countries respectively.
At the subnational level, we obtain data for European countries for which data
at the NUTS 2 region level are available from Eurostat.6 This data covers 251
NUTS2 regions in Europe covering EU member countries, countries that are in
accession talks with the EU along with members of the European Economic Area.
To build the EU-NUTS2 donor pool, we use the gross value added at basic prices
by NUTS 2 regions. Data for 175 of 251 regions are consistently available during
2000-2018. These regions can be used to construct the doppelganger.
We also leverage US subnational-level data. Specifically, we use real gross do-
mestic product (GDP) by states from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.7 This
includes data for 50 US states and the District of Columbia. The real estimates
of GDP are measured in chained 2012 dollars. We use this dataset to build the
US-STATES donor pool. The motivation to draw particular emphasis on US sub-
national data in addition to EU subnational data is twofold: first, the US is one
of the few countries that provide timely subnational data that is readily available
up to 2018. Second, in Born et al. (2019) the US is the donor country with the
largest weight contributing to the Doppelganger. Note that we restrict the set of
units to be included to only include countries and regions for which real GDP is
consistently available for each time period for which we also have UK data either
quarterly or annual.
We next describe the various donor pool sets that we leverage.
2.2 Donor Pool Sets
We construct synthetic controls for each of the UK’s 382 administrative districts
using annual data. In addition, we also construct synthetic controls for each of the
6The closest comparable data is “Gross value added at basic prices by NUTS regions”, which
is accessible from https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/nama_10r_3gva
7This data is available at https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?acrdn=5&isuri=1&
reqid=70&step=1.
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UK’s 12 regions using quarterly data. In doing so, we we leverage on a broad set
of donor pools.
For the region-level analysis leveraging quarterly data, we consider quarterly
data coming from three donor pools: G20 (18 countries), OECD (33 countries), and
EU member countries (27 countries). For the district-level analysis, we leverage an-
nual data from five donor pools: G20 (18 countries), OECD (33 countries), and EU
member countries (27 countries) in addition to data pertaining to NUTS2 regions
in European countries (175 regions) and US states (50 states plus DC).
While the synthetic control method can be performed for a single donor pool
set – indeed, Born et al. (2019) exclusively consider the set of OECD countries as
donor pool to construct the counterfactual UK economy –, we take a step further.
We proceed by constructing the full set of feasible combinations of donor pools that
can be drawn from the sets of individual donor pools. For the quarterly analysis,





3− 1 = 7
donor pool sets (the EU, OECD, G20; the pairs EU and OECD, EU and G20, G20
and OECD; and the triplet EU, OECD and G20). Given that we have quarterly data
for twelve UK regions, this entails constructing 12 × 7 synthetic control estimates.
For the district-level annual data, the potential set of combinations of donor





5 − 1 = 31
possible combinations of the donor pool sets. The most comprehensive donor
pool set would include annual data from OECD, G20, EU27 member countries
as well as the subnational annual data at the NUTS2 data for EU member states
and the data for the US States. In case a country has subnational data available,
we retain the subnational data and exclude the national-level data. To illustrate:
Germany is a member of the EU, the G20 and the OECD and reports data at
NUTS2 level to Eurostat. As a result, in all the data sets that draw on NUTS2 data,
we represent Germany as its NUTS2 regions exclusively. This is to ensure that we
are not including the same political concept at multiple spatial resolutions. The
above implies that for the 382 UK districts for which annual data is available, we
construct a total of 382× 31 = 11, 842 different synthetic control estimates.
Appendix Table A2 provides the full set of combinations leveraged for the
district-level analysis. Mechanically, the largest donor pool consists of the superset
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of all potential donors (the combined set consisting of EU-NUTS2, US-STATES,
G20, OECD and EU). This donor pool consists of 253 spatial units.
2.3 Constructing Synthetic Controls
To construct a synthetic control for each potential donor pool, we proceed as
follows. We fix a UK region d, and one of the donor pool set S . As explained above,
the donor pool sets are all the possible combinations among NUTS2 regions in EU,
states in the US, and G20, OECD and EU member countries for the district-level
annual data as well as all combinations of donors that can be build when drawing
quarterly data from the G20, OECD and EU countries quarterly-level data.
Let xr be the real output of region r. This is either measured annually between
2000 and 2015, thus 16 data points; or for the quarterly data, the 18 data points
from 2012Q1 to 2016Q2. For the annual data we consider 2015 as the last pre-vote
period. For the quarterly data, we consider 2016Q2 as the last time period before
the Brexit-vote as the EU referendum was held on 23 June 2016.
Let Xs denote a matrix of the real GDP of the units in the donor pool com-
bination s ∈ S . Thus Xs is of dimension |T0| × n(s), where n(s) is the num-
ber of units in donor pool s and |T0| indicates the number of time period prior
to the EU referendum vote (i.e. T0 = {2000, ..., 2015} for the annual data and
T0 = {2012Q1, ..., 2016Q2} for the quarterly data). The number of columns of Xs
then varies from n(s) = 18, if s is relative to G20 countries only, to n(s) = 253
when s consists of the superset of all spatial units.
The weights wds ≡ {wd1, . . . , wdn(s)}, representing the importance of unit {1, . . . , n(s)}
in the combined donor pool to approximate the UK region r, is selected to mini-
mize the mean squared error criteria:
wˆds = arg min
wds∈R
(xr − Xswds )′V(xr − Xswds ) (1)





j = 1. V is a symmetric positive semi-definite matrix that represents the
relative importance of the each characteristic in the mean squared error minimiza-
tion. Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Born
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et al. (2019), we select V that minimizes the pre-intervention mean squared pre-
diction error using code implementations in Matlab. Each wˆds then allows us to
construct a counterfactual series yˆsd,t for each region or district for 2016, 2017 and
2018 or for the quarterly period post 2016Q2 up to 2019Q3.
2.4 Model selection
Since we construct a total of 31 distinct synthetic controls for each district in the
annual data – as well as seven distinct synthetic controls for the quarterly data –
we can further identify among the set of synthetic controls a “best” representation
of the UK region or district prior to the Brexit-vote. Naturally, one would expect
that the “best” series among the set S may be the product of the most extensive
donor pool. This is a mechanic result: a larger donorpool makes it easier to fit
pre-treatment outcomes even when there are substantial discrepancies in factor
loadings between the treated unit and the synthetic control.
We construct, for each district or region, the following measures of goodness













(xtd − Xt,swˆds )2 (3)
MAPEsd = maxt∈T0
|xtd − Xt,swˆsd| (4)
where ”AAPE” stands for ”average absolute projection error”, ”RMSPE” stands for
”root mean square projection error” and ”MAPE” is the maximum projection error.
These criteria are meant to capture the goodness of fit for a given donor pool set
s, aggregating information across regions or district and pre-intervention periods
T0. Having constructed these measures for each district or region from the set of
synthetic controls that have been constructed, we can select a “best” model that,
among the set of synthetic controls, minimizes these three respective goodness-of-
fit measures. Appendix Table A3 provides a tabulation of the 31 donor pool sets
as well as the number of districts that have been selected to be “the best” model
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using each of the three goodness-of-fit measures. This highlights that the “best
model” among the 31 candidate models is not unanimously the one that is built
with the most extensive donor pool set.
Ensemble model In addition to these more standard measures to identify a “best
model” we also construct an ensemble model. The idea for using an ensemble
method is inspired by the popularity of ensemble methods in machine learning
(see e.g. Valentini and Dietterich (2002) on support-vector machines). Ultimately,
ensemble methods use multiple learning algorithms to obtain better predictive per-
formance than could be obtained from any of the constituent learning algorithms
alone. The ensemble of models may average out biases that may be introduced
due to overfitting. This is specifically relevant in our setting as naturally, when
moving from national- to subnational data, naturally the donor pool becomes sig-
nificantly larger. Abadie et al. (2010) show that the bias the bias bound of the
synthetic control-based treatment effect estimate depends positively on the size of
the donorpool. In the case of panel settings using synthetic control, Athey et al.
(2019) found that the predictive accuracy of an ensemble method appears to domi-
nate individual methods in terms of their predictive performance. That is, for each





This headline synthetic control estimator is computed as a simple average
across the 31 (7) synthetic control for each series for the annual (quarterly) data.
2.5 Donor pool permutation tests
In addition to the ensemble estimator above, we further construct another en-
semble estimator that is the result of a simulation approach. The simulation ap-
proach recognizes the potential issue whereby overfitting may introduce a bias
in the out-of-sample projection. Such biases may be increasing in the size of the
donor pool and decreasing in the pre-treatment period length.
In our setting, especially when studying subnational UK data at the district-
level and when drawing in subnational data from other countries, we have a
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rapidly exploding size of a donor pool (though spatial units are nested) and a
relatively short pre-treatment period. To assess whether introduces a potential
problem for our analysis we construct a further set of 70 synthetic control donor
sets Ssim for the annual data. For each donor pool size ranging from 10, 15, 20, 25,
30, 35, and 40, we draw ten random samples random samples of potential donors
and identify the weights the optimal weights in these artificially constrained donor
pool. We draw these samples from the most comprehensive donor pool consist-
ing of the superset of US States, NUTS2 regions, EU27, OECD and G20 countries,
representing a country through subnational data whenever that data is available.
Similarly, we construct a set of 70 synthetic controls that are built using random
samples of donor pools with the donor pool size ranging from 5, 10, 15, ..., 30 (note
that the maximal number if constrained at 33 for the quarterly data).
The result is a further 70 counterfactual series that come from quite constrained
and randomly selected donor pools. As such, each of these series individually is
posed to be less accurate; yet, in their ensemble, they may have a relatively high





This approach of restricting the donor pool size mechanically reduces con-
cerns over biases introduced by mechanically overfitting as the donor pool size
is ultimately constrained to include at most 40 units. This comes at the cost that
constraining the donor pool may introduce biases due to the production of poor
performance synthetic controls. The ensemble method again, while not having
well-defined statistical properties, can help wash out these biases.
The simulation approach further, will let us study the empirical distribution
of the “best” synthetic control estimate (either the ensemble model or the mod-
els identified using equations (2)-(4)) against the full set of other synthetic control
estimates obtained from various donor pools. For the subnational data, we have
a total of 101 synthetic control estimates. In some visual presentation we high-
light the extent to which the “best” estimate appears to be an outlier vis-a-vis the
estimates that can be obtained using alternative donor pools. This will highlight
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the relative robustness of a specific estimate of the output gap induced by the
Brexit-vote vis-a-vis the specific donor pool choice.
2.6 Placebo Brexit-votes in donor pool
We further conduct placebo Brexit-vote experiments. Given the relatively short
pre-Brexit vote data periods, due to lack of historical subnational data availability,
it makes little sense to conduct the type of placebos that shift a “placebo Brexit-
vote” back in time. Rather, we conduct a set of placebo tests whereby we estimate
synthetic controls for each of the donor pool spatial units, exposing each of them
to a placebo “Brexit vote”. If our benchmark estimate for the UK regions are
capturing the causal impact of the referendum vote, its effect should dominate
any possible impact of the fictitious Brexit votes in the synthetic control set.
We restrict the analysis to the most comprehensive donor pool set comprising
the superset of NUTS2, US States, OECD, G20 and EU27 countries. Within that
superset, that includes 253 spatial units, we only construct placebos for the set of
spatial units that ever are included in the set of donor spatial units – this reduces
down the set of regions to 138 donors. Further, we also ensure that different re-
gions within a country are not serving as a donor to each other to mimic the fact
that placebo “Brexit votes” are country-level events. We present visually the gaps
between the synthetic controls and the actual values for each of the 138 donors, in
addition, to the estimate for the actual district. This further allows the construc-
tion of a empirical p-value capturing the share of placebo Brexit-vote output gap
estimates that are below (or above), the estimate pertaining to each specific UK
region or district.
2.7 Top-down and bottom-up consistency
Lastly, we highlight that the results are consistent across different levels of
spatial aggregation. We start by presenting results pertaining to synthetic control
estimates across UK regions and constituent countries. The implied Brexit-vote
costs aggregated up are very similar in comparison to estimates for the UK as a
whole studied in Born et al. (2019) and Springford (2019). We conduct the analysis
further across each of the UK’s 382 local authority districts up to 2018. The district-
level impact estimates, aggregated up to the region or country level are again, very
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consistent with the region-level results as well as the country-level evidence from
Born et al. (2019) and Springford (2019).
Throughout, we find very consistent estimates, highlighting the robustness of
the results and further highlighting that we are likely to adequately capture the
heterogeneity of the Brexit-vote economic impact across regions and districts.
2.8 Discussion
There are a number of limitations on the estimation of the counterfactual re-
gion yˆd. In particular, there is the risk of overfitting given the relative scarcity of
consistent subnational data at the annual level and quarterly level prior to the EU
referendum. This mechanically constrains the donor pool to a subset of countries.
We address this potential problem several ways. First, in using the combined coun-
terfactual measure as an ensemble yˆd, the estimates are condensing the projections
across all of donor pools and are not being driven by a single choice. Second, as
we show in the next subsection, the cost of Brexit is relatively stable across donor
pools to begin with. Third, we arrive to very similar impact estimate compared to
Born et al. (2019) if we aggregate the regional shocks to the national level. Lastly,
we also adopt an ensemble method using a random donor pool permutations of
different sizes which, again, produce very similar results. Overall, this points to a
relative stability of our projections and that overfitting is not contributing signifi-
cantly to the results we obtain.
Throughout the exercise, our identifying assumption is that the UK regional
economy would have developed as the synthetic unit had it not been for the Brexit
vote. This is assumption plausible given that Brexit vote was largely unexpected
(see Born et al. (2019)). In turn, we can quantify the Brexit impact as the difference
between the synthetic control and the realized values.
3 What are the costs of the Brexit-vote across UK’s re-
gions?
The UK’s referendum on EU membership in 2016 saw majorities in favor of
Leave only in England and marginally in Wales – though some analysis suggests
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that the Welsh vote was tipped in favor of Leave due to English retirees settling
there (see Dorling, 2018). Northern Ireland and Scotland overwhelmingly voted
in favor of the UK remaining a member of the European Union. The tension that
the split vote across the UK’s constituent countries has created gives further rise
to fears that the UK may disintegrate.
Visual results Figure 1 presents the results studying the evolution of real GDP
over time across the UK’s constituent countries: England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. The figure plots the ensemble synthetic control estimate con-
structed for the relevant country specific real GDP series. The figures suggest that
the synthetic controls that are constructed are quite consistently tracking the UK’s
evolution prior to the EU referendum vote. With the exception of Wales, all of the
UK’s other constituent countries see significant divergence from their respective
quarterly readings. On average, the English, Scottish and Northern Irish gross-
value added appears to be 2.5, 2.1 and 4.0 percentage points smaller in 2018.
Figure 2 presents the synthetic control estimates for the remaining English re-
gions. Throughout the synthetic control estimates quite closely track the evolution
of the actual regional figures prior to the EU referendum vote, with most English
regions experiencing significant divergence post 2016. Yorkshire and The Humber,
the North West, the East and, to some extent, also the West Midlands, recorded
a slightly delayed divergence – this may be due to these regions potentially tem-
porarily benefiting from the devaluation of the pound as suggested by Broadbent
et al. (2019).
Tabular results We next present the estimates of the size of the output losses in
real terms. These are summarized in tabular format in Table 1 and Table 2. Table
1 presents the results in terms of the difference in the growth rates, while Table 2
presents the estimates capturing the Brexit-vote induced output loss measured in
pounds.
In relative terms, the UK’s most exposed region to the Brexit-vote costs so far
is the West Midlands, followed by Northern Ireland, the South West and the South
East respectively. The least exposed regions is, as indicated, Wales , Yorkshire &
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the Humber and, at least in 2019, London. London saw a significant contraction in
2018 but was subsequently reducing some of the losses in 2019 – see Figure 2.
In absolute terms, Table 2, highlights that there is not a single overall region that
can be classified as having gained in economic activity vis-a-vis their respective
synthetic control. The absolute losses are largest in London and the South East in
2018 standing at £17 billion in London and 9.4 billion in the South East. We note
that the aggregated losses estimated from regional data alone come reasonably
close to estimates from Born et al. (2019): across the 12 regions, the losses add up
to £50 billions in 2019 and £46 billion – or around 2.3 - 2.5 percent relative to the
UK’s 2015 GDP. Again, the numbers are very consistent with the figures in Born
et al. (2019) and Springford (2019).
We next turn to the main focus of the analysis in this paper: the estimates of
the district-level Brexit-vote cost to date. We will present main estimates and relate
these to the exercise at the regional level conducted so far, highlighting again that
these produce very similar results. Lastly, we speak to some of the underlying
economic mechanisms and main correlates that explain the emerging gap between
UK regional gross value added and those of the respective synthetic controls.
4 What are the district-level cost of Brexit so far?
We construct counterfactuals for all the 382 districts in the United Kingdom
in addition to the region-level analysis presented thus far. The district-level anal-
ysis will help shed some light on the underlying economic adjustments taking
place. Naturally, we can not present 382 plots in this paper. The full visualizations
are available on https://www.brexitcost.org. We next present some archetypes
along with some stylized results.
4.1 Brexit-vote cost archetypes
In Figure 3 exemplifies the projected Brexit-vote effect for a small subset of dis-
tricts. In Panel A and B, we show the case of two districts that can be called Brexit
losers. This occurs because the actually realized real gross-value added series re-
alized GDP value (dashed line) is significantly below the ensemble estimate of the
synthetic control counterfactuals (solid line), but only after 2015. This suggests
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that these districts experienced notably weaker growth or even contractions due to
the “Brexit vote”.
Panel A refers to the district of Northampton, in which 58.4% of voters sup-
ported Leave in 2016. This district saw noticeably slower growth vis-a-vis the
synthetic control estimate.8 In Panel B we show the corresponding output for the
borough of Lewisham in London which, again, substantially not only grew slower
but appears to have lost output in comparison to the non-Brexit counterfactual.9
Finally, Panel C shows a Brexit winner (Dudley) and Panel D shows the impact
on district that was unaffected in the most part (Newham Borough in London).
The shaded area represents one standard deviation of the pre-treatment difference
between the UK and its synthetic control.
As indicated, we are not able to include 382 full sets of graphs for each district
in this paper. Rather the visualizations are provided http://www.warwickeconometrics.
co/brexit-impact/. In Figure 4 we provide a summary of what type of informa-
tion is presented on that webpage for each district using the example of Lewisham
district. The top figure provides the ensemble synthetic control estimate along with
the actual realized GDP growth relative to 2015. In the row below, we present on
the left-hand side the full distribution of synthetic control estimates constructed
using all different approaches as dark grey lines. These are shaded such that
if multiple lines overlay, they appear visually darker. We overlay again, the en-
semble synthetic control estimate (solid red) as well as the actual data that was
reported by the ONS as a dashed blue line. The results highlight that the degree of
uncertainty indicated by the confidence bands in the main figure are very similar
vis-a-vis a host of other synthetic controls that could be constructed. Further, the
results also will help shed a light to what extent the specific donor pool sample
choice may be important or not important in shaping the results. For the year
2018, the difference between yˆENSd,2018 − yd,2018, i.e. the difference in the growth rates
between the synthetic control estimate and the actual value for 2018 is indicated
as a vertical line. The kernel density is indicating the distribution of this measure





constructed for each of the 70 synthetic controls that are constructed using the ran-
domly selected donor pools of fixed size. This highlights the extent to which the
yˆENSd,2018− yd,2018 is an outlier vis-a-vis the estimates that could be constructed using
alternative donor pools.
Lastly, we also present visually the results from a set of placebo exercises de-
scribed in Section 2.6. For each of the 138 potential donors that are ever included
with non-zero weight we estimate a “fake Brexit” vote impact. We present these
placebo estimates, plotting the normalized difference of yˆsd,t − yd,t in the left figure
for each 138 placebo Brexit-votes along with that measure for the “best synthetic
control” estimate for Lewisham district as a red solid line. The right panel again,
indicates the estimate of yˆsd,2018 − yd,2018 for Lewisham district as a vertical line
against the distribution of that difference for each of the placebo Brexit-vote dis-
tricts. We would expect the estimate for Lewisham to clearly stand out relative to
the empirical distribution of the placebo Brexit impacts, which are clearly centered
around 0. This provides us with an alternative way of conducting inference as
to whether treatment effects measured are statistically significant or not. In the
case of Lewisham, 98% of placebo estimates are above the value of the Brexit-vote
output gap for Lewisham.
In Subsection 4.3, we investigate the economic fundamentals that are correlated
with the variation in the Brexit-vote cost or benefit across districts to date. We first
proceed to explain how we classify the districts in a consistent manner regarding
the estimated Brexit effects and present the summary of the results in tabular form
as well as in regional aggregated forms.
4.2 Classification of districts as Winners and Losers
We classify individual districts as “Brexit winners” or “Brexit losers.” To do
so, we study the difference in the figures for Gross Value Added for 2018 vis-a-
vis the synthetic control of each district constructed for each of the potential 101
donor pools (31 constructed with systematic donor pools, 70 constructed using
the sampling approach). A district is classified as a “Brexit loser” if in at least
90% of the 101 synthetic control series, the 2018 Real Gross Value Added value is
below the respective value of the synthetic control. Similarly, a district is classified
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as a Brexit winner, if it meets the reverse conditions for positive outcomes. The
remaining districts are classified as Unclear – i.e. appearing, by 2018 as neither
winners nor losers.10
Figure 5 shows the result of this ensemble classification on a map. The figure
on the left-hand side shows codes the districts that were Brexit losers (in red),
Brexit winners (blue) and those that did not meet the criteria for either (in grey).
The figure on the right-hand side displays the quintiles in the distribution of the
real GDP losses (or gains) expressed in pounds per capita across districts in 2018
relative to the respective synthetic control. It is evident that the vast majority of
districts, around 255 out of 382 districts report a negative value; with a minority
of 127 districts reporting a positive output gap vis-a-vis the ensemble of synthetic
controls. This means the number of district that record relative losses is twice as
high as the number of districts that saw sizable gains.
We compare Brexit-vote winners and losers along a host of characteristics in
Table A4. In terms of the classification, 168 districts are classified as clear “Brexit
losers” according to the above rule, while only 78 districts are classified as clear
“Brexit winners” in 2018. In Panel A of Appendix Table A4 it becomes clear that
the above classification is quite successful in separating districts that appear to
have lower or higher output relative to their respective synthetic controls, with
districts classified as Brexit losers having notably lower gross-value added relative
to their synthetic controls and districts classified as Brexit-vote winners having
higher output.
The subsequent panels of Appendix Table A4 explore to what extent there are
notable differences in socio-economic characteristics of districts classified as Brexit-
vote losers or winners. Overall there are relatively few notable differences high-
lighting that the classification which is a result of the synthetic control estimates is
not just capturing or confounding some other pre-EU referendum systematic dif-
ferences across districts. Among the few notable differences, we see that districts
classified as Brexit winners appear to exhibit an around 5 percentage points higher
10Broadbent et al. (2019) highlight that the depreciation of the pound in the wake of the Brexit
vote in 2016 created a temporary positive windfall for exporters which may have had a positive
temporary effect on local economies.
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level of support for Leave in 2016, and also stand out as having higher turnout.
They have a notably higher share of relatively young residents, were more exposed
to the 2008/2009 financial crisis as measured by the unemployment rate increase
between 2007 and 2009, and appear to be slightly more urban having a notably
lower share of agriculture and mining employment.
In the next section we will study what are the main correlates that capture the
variation across districts and within regions.
4.3 What drives the spatial distribution of the Brexit losses?
District-level estimates in detail Appendix Table A5 provides the full list of a
host of measures capturing the Brexit-vote cost or economic gains across districts
in detail. As indicated, in total, we note that out of the 382 districts, 168 (44 percent)
emerge as Brexit losers and only 78 (20 percent) emerge Brexit winners. For every
district that appears to be winning, there are two districts that are losing. In Table
3 we present a condensed version of the Appendix Table A5 focusing on the top
10 of districts that appear to be losing as a result of the Brexit vote according to
the losses in gross-value added per capita. We also present the five districts that
appear to have gained the most since the EU referendum vote – in keeping with
the two-to-one ratio of losers to winners.
The table provides the Region and District name, along with the classification
as per the above classification rule. We also provide the 2015 GVA baseline val-
ues expressed in real £million along with a per capita measure. The subsequent
columns present the ensemble estimate of the output gap between a district and
its ensemble estimated synthetic control expressed in absolute real £million; in
percentage points; and expressed in per-capita terms. The subsequent additional
columns provide additional estimates in absolute terms. Specifically, we provide a
confidence band for the ensemble estimator gap (Low/High) that captures a one
standard deviation of the pre-Brexit vote difference between the ensemble estimate
and the synthetic control on either side. We further provide the central point esti-
mates implied in the simulated donor pool ensemble estimate along with the best
series identified according to the AAPEs, RMSPEs and MAPEs criteria, as defined
in Equations (2)-(4).
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The losses in terms of gross-value added per capita are largest in Darlington,
in the Northeast at £-11,133 per capita. On the other side, the gains are largest in
Westminster, London, standing at £12,747 per capita. Though, on average and in
total, the gains are usually much smaller compared to the losses.
Region-level distribution of Brexit losses In Table 4 we aggregate up the district-
level estimates to the broad UK NUTS1 regions. The first three columns in Table
4 provide the numbers of districts classified as being Brexit winner or losers or
with ambiguous assignment within each of the UK’s 12 regions. The subsequent
columns provide the aggregated district-level estimates in millions of pounds in
real terms. The central estimate from the ensemble model across the 31 donor
pools, along with the respective upper- and lower bounds are provided, along
with the ensemble estimate that is constructed using the randomly sampled donor
pools. In the last three columns, we present the losses that are obtained by a single
donor pool, selected according to the AAPEs, RMSPEs and MAPEs criteria, as in
Equations (2)-(4). We note that the losses are consistent across donor pools selected
by different criteria, and also with the ensemble classifier. Nevertheless, is notable
heterogeneity across regions. In the South East , 39 out of 67 districts are classified
as being Brexit losers. London equally exhibits a higher share of districts classified
to be a Brexit loser. For every district that appears to be winning, there are two
districts that are losing.
The aggregated district-level estimates are not that far off from the estimates in
the previous section: the combined sum of the individual gaps adds up to £45.6
billion for 2018; the region-level estimates had a combined total effect summed
up across regions of £46.1 billion. There are a few differences in the geographic
attribution: the quarterly figures for 2018 suggested higher losses in the West Mid-
lands, for example. Yet, the overall patterns are very comparable. The consistency
in the estimates obtained across methods and across underlying datasets is indica-
tive of the broader robustness of the results.
We next study patterns that appear to drive the variation across districts, within
regions.
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Empirical specification We next look at some of the correlates that are associated
with higher, or lower, output losses due to the Brexit-vote. This is, to a significant
extent, motivated by much of the ex-ante impact modelling which suggests that
the regional economic impact of any Brexit-vote may actually exacerbate some of
the inequalities that several studies have highlighted may have brought about the
vote for Brexit to begin with (see e.g. Colantone and Stanig (2018) on the impact
of trade integration; Fetzer (2018) on the role of welfare-reforms; and Becker et al.
(2017) for a comprehensive correlational analysis).
To study inter-regional variation in the incidence of the Brexit-cost so far, we
focus on the output loss measures expressed in % terms. This amounts to treating
each district equally in terms of their respective size of the economy. We leverage a
host of data drawn, among others, from Becker et al. (2017) to explore correlational
patterns.
We estimate
∆y˜d,r(d),t = αr + β
′Xd + ed (5)
where ∆y˜d,r(d),t = yd,r(d),t − yˆENSd,r(d),t measures the difference in real growth rate
between the district’s actually recorded growth and the growth of the ensemble-
method identified synthetic control. The variable Xd will capture a range of
district-level characteristics that we explore. The above regression further con-
trols for region level fixed effects, αr to zoom in on the within-region variation
across districts, given the significant heterogeneity that was identified in Figure
A1. Standard errors uses robust standard errors.11
Brexit-vote cost and Leave support A natural first exercise is to study whether
there exists a relationship between the district level output losses that we attribute
to the Brexit-vote and the support for Leave in the 2016 EU referendum. In Figure
6 we present results summarizing the above regression model (5) as a binned scat-
ter plot. The figure highlights that there is a notable gradient indicating that the
districts that saw highest support for Brexit in 2016 experience noticeable larger
11Technically, a bootstrapping procedure may be more adequate given that the left-hand side
regressor is a fitted regressor. It is, however, unclear what type of bootstrapping procedure to
employ in the given setup.
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output losses relative to their respective synthetic control. Summarizing this re-
lationship, that is quite robust across all the output gap measures (see Appendix
Table A6), we see that districts that, on average, had a 10 percentage point higher
level of support for Leave, see a 0.9 percentage points higher output loss in 2018
due to the Brexit-vote.
This is not inconsistent with some ex-ante impact modeling that has expressed
fears that the regions that most strongly came out in favour of Brexit may ulti-
mately be the ones that may be most adversely affected by it (see e.g. Los et al.,
2017). This suggests that regional economic inequalities that strongly came out in
descriptive work around the Brexit vote (see e.g. Becker et al., 2017; Alabrese et al.,
2019) may have already exacerbated as a result of the Brexit-vote.
Role of Local economic structure We next explore the role of local economic
structure using two measures: the 2011 Census sector-level employment shares or
the sector-level average real gross-value added share over the period from 2010-
2015. The definitions of sectors slightly differ due to the data granularity. The
results are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
They suggest that districts that exhibit higher employment and gross-value
added shares in Manufacturing are strongly driving the reduction in Gross Value
Added relative to the synthetic control. In Appendix Figure A2, we estimate the
above cross-sectional regression for each year and note that this pattern is only
emerging strongly post 2015.
Many ex-ante impact studies suggested that the economic cost of Brexit may
be particularly pronounced in districts that have a high reliance on manufacturing
sector.
District-level wages Wage levels serve as a common productivity estimate. In
Table 8 we document some notable patterns around the structure of wages across
districts and to what extent patterns prior to 2016 are affecting the evolution of
the synthetic control after the Brexit-vote. Specifically, the results suggest that the
output losses vis-a-vis a synthetic control are more pronounced in districts with
higher median- and mean hourly pay levels. They are further larger in districts that
25
exhibit greater inequality in pay, measured as the interquartile range of hourly pay
contrasting the difference between the 75th and the 25th percentile of pay. Districts
that saw notable growth in lower quantiles of pay, specifically the 10th percentile
from 2005 to 2015 seem to be more affected by the Brexit-vote.
Overall the patterns are quite mixed: the observation that Brexit-vote costs are
most concentrated in districts with higher median or mean wage levels may sug-
gest that the costs of the Brexit-vote may be born by the districts that have higher
levels of productivity – this could help reduce regional inequalities across the UK.
On the other hand, the patterns further suggest that the losses are concentrated
among districts with a high degree of heterogeneity or inequality of pay structure
and further, particularly in parts of the UK that saw sizable wage growth at the
bottom end of the wage distribution. The latter could indicate that the Brexit-vote
costs may have undermined catch-up of regions that may have lagged behind.
Other notable patterns Lastly, we turn to a few other notable patterns. Specif-
ically, much of the work on Brexit has highlighted the dominant role that educa-
tional attainment or formal qualifications appears to drive the regional differences
in voting patterns in the 2016 EU referendum vote. In Table 9 we document that
the costs of Brexit appear to actually exacerbate the already existing regional eco-
nomic cleavages. Specifically, columns (1) and (2) highlight that the contraction
in economic activity vis-a-vis the respective ensemble synthetic control is more
concentrated in districts with higher share of residents with no formal qualifica-
tions; conversely, the output losses are markedly smaller in districts which boasts
a relatively well-educated resident population measured as of the 2011 Census.
Turning to unemployment or economic participation, we observe that the average
level of unemployment prior to 2015 does not appear to be correlated with the
merging gap between districts and their respective synthetic controls. Rather, we
see that districts that have higher rates of self-employment and experienced more
notable increases in unemployment around the 2008 financial crisis exhibit less
pronounced output losses due to the Brexit-vote.
Lastly, we also speak to the topic of immigration that was very prominently
discussed during the EU referendum. We observe that the output losses and the
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costs due to Brexit appear to be particularly concentrated in districts that exhibit
higher levels of migration from EU Accession countries (the predominantly East-
ern European countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2008 respectively). Throughout
the above results do suggest that, quite possibly and consistent with much of the
ex-ante impact modelling around the cost of Brexit to date, the economic impact
of the Brexit-vote may have already served to exacerbate regional economic in-
equalities that came out in the EU referendum vote, despite Brexit – in the form
of material changes to the terms of trade and market access – still not having
materialized.
Appendix Figure A3 further highlights that there is a notable correlation be-
tween the output loss due to the Brexit-vote across districts and the share of work-
ers on furlough in May 2020 as a result of the COVID19 pandemic. The estimate
suggests that districts more exposed to Brexit cost to date have a sizeably higher
share of workers currently furloughed. For every one percentage point higher out-
put loss due to the Brexit-vote, the share of employees on furlough (using 2018
BRES employment data as a denominator) is 0.15 percentage points higher.
4.4 On the underlying mechanisms
Lastly, we present some stylized facts of what is happening to the economies in
districts that seem to be losing in growth as a result of Brexit. As indicated, firms
may rationally respond to the prospect of worsening market access by ultimately,
freezing capital investment that may be difficult to salvage in case a hard Brexit
materializes (see also Faccini and Palombo, 2019). Nevertheless, the short term
incentives may be for firms to maintain output levels as ultimately, market access
will still be the same until at least January 2021.12
The freeze in investment may result in firms having to expand their workforce
and payrolls in order to maintain output. This should be felt in particular in dis-
tricts were the investment freezes significantly contribute to the gap between the
district GDP measure and its synthetic control. As firms operate now with ineffi-
12Broadbent et al. (2019) similarly highlight to the potential confounding effect that the depre-
ciation of the pound in the wake of the Brexit vote in 2016 may have created as it provided a
temporary windfall for firms that are exporting into the single market. This may have led to local
economies appearing more resilient than they actually are.
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cient capital-to-labor ratios and a slowly eroding capital stock, naturally, we would
expect output per worker to decline – this decline should be most concentrated in
districts that appear to be hardest hit vis-a-vis their respective synthetic control.
Figure 7 presents some evidence that speaks to this hypothesis by studying the
data on gross-value added, along with employment and overall compensation of
employees at the district level. The estimates underlying the figures are presented
in Table 10. Panel A highlights that, on average, districts added significant em-
ployment relative to 2015 – on average, adding around 2.8 percentage points to the
stock of employment. Even among the set of districts with relatively high expo-
sure to the Brexit-vote costs in 2018 relative to 2015 – the Brexit-vote loser districts
– employment growth was positive at 1.2 percentage points. Panel B highlights
that there was sizable growth in payrolls. In Brexit-vote loser districts, overall pay-
rolls expanded, in real terms, by 5.73 percentage points. This is only marginally
smaller compared to the overall average of 6.47 percentage points. Lastly, panel C
highlights what is happening to productivity measured as real Gross Value Added
output per worker. This figure has drastically declined suggesting that among the
“Brexit losers”, productivity growth was -2.6 percentage points compared to an
overall average growth of 1 percentage points between 2015 and 2018.
The observation that districts added employment and expanded payroll, while
experiencing significant declines in productivity is suggestive that firms may have
shifted away from capital to labor into a using more intensively a factor of produc-
tion that can easily be discarded in the short-term once Brexit becomes a de-facto
reality in form of changed market access from January 2020 onwards. This sets
up the possibility of significant labor market dislocations should a hard Brexit be-
come a political reality in 2020 as that employment growth is built on a shaky
foundation.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides some first insights into the regional economic impact of
Brexit to date. Much of the literature studying the economic impact of the Brexit-
vote to date have exclusively focused on country-wide or sector-wide estimation
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approaches. These broadly ignore the underlying economic geography. This is
particularly important as the regional variation in socio-economic characteristics
of the resident population has been identified as an important driver behind the
regional differences in the extent of support for Leave in the 2016 EU referendum.
The research confirms existing work that has estimated that by 2018, Brexit
has cost the UK economy at least two percent of real output. We find that these
costs are far from evenly distributed across the UK. Within regions, districts whose
regional economies depend heavily on manufacturing sector, appear to be particu-
larly severely hit. Similarly, districts with relatively higher shares of residents with
low educational attainment appear more exposed. Lastly, we also find that districts
with higher support for Brexit in 2016 appear also more exposed to the Brexit-vote
cost too date – this highlights that, quite likely, the cost of Brexit may exacerbate
the already large regional economic disparities across regions in the UK. This is
particularly concerning as growing economic inequalities may further accelerate a
trend that may result in the political disintegration of the United Kingdom.
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Figure 1: Ensemble estimate of the impact of Brexit-vote on UK constituent countries real GDP
Panel A: England Panel B: Scotland
Panel C: Wales Panel D: Northern Ireland
Notes: Figure plots the synthetic control value of the deviation of real GDP relative to 2015 constructed using different donor pools indicated in the figure panels against the
actually realized UK real GDP over time.
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Figure 2: Quarterly Region-Level Synthetic Control Estimates Across Other English Regions
Panel A: North East Panel B: North West Panel C: Yorkshire & the Humber
Panel D: East Midlands Panel E: West Midlands Panel F: East
Panel G: London Panel H: South East Panel I: South West
Notes: Figure plots the synthetic control value of the deviation of real quarterly GDP relative to 2016 Q2 constructed for each of the nine English NUTS1 regions. The dotted
line indicates the regions realized real GDP growth relative to 2016Q2 while the red line indicates the ensemble synthetic control estimate.
34
Figure 3: Example Curves for a Select Set of Districts
Panel A: Northampton Panel B: Lewisham
Panel C: Dudley Panel D: Newham
Notes: Figures plot the realized (blue) and counterfactual path (red) of real GDP relative to 2015 across regions in the UK highlighting Northampton and Lewisham as
examples of districts classified as “Brexit losers” in Panels A and B; Dudley, for a positive impact of Brexit in Panel C; and neutral effect on the London borough of Newham.
The counterfactual path is the ensemble average across the 31 synthetic controls constructed across different donor pools.
35
Figure 4: District-specific Brexit-vote information card: the case of Lewisham
Ensemble estimate for Lewisham
Donor pool simulation
Synthetic control estimates Distribution of 2018 estimate
Placebo test distribution
Placebo estimates Distribution of 2018 placebo estimates
Notes: Figures plot sample information provided on https://www.brexitcost.org. The top panel presents the ensemble
synthetic control estimate (solid) of real gross value added relative to 2015 as well as the actual series (dashed). The “donor
pool simulation” presents the full distribution of all synthetic control estimates constructed through the permutation test
whereby synthetic control estimates are constructed using 70 donor pools of different sizes that are randomly selected. The
right figure presents the kernel density estimate of the distribution of the actual gap between the ensemble estimate and
the actual line in 2018 vis-a-vis the distribution of that measure for all other synthetic control estimates constructed. The
bottom row presents results from a placebo tests whereby synthetic control estimates are constructed for 138 donors that
are ever drawn upon in the estimate vis-a-vis the estimate of the Brexit-output gap for the actual district. The right panel
presents again the empirical distribution of the 2018 gap vis-a-vis the placebo “Brexit” measures.
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Figure 5: District Level Classifications and Output Losses By 2018
Notes: Left figure plots the classification of districts into losers, winners or no clear based on the estimate of the output gap obtained from the ensemble synthetic control
that was constructed using the 101 potential synthetic control estimates constructed for each district. The right figure plots out the distribution of gross-value added losses
measured in pounds per capita across UK districts as of 2018 expressed in real 2015 units.
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Figure 6: Relationship between support for Leave and District-Level Output Losses
By 2018 relative to 2015
Notes: Figure plots a binned scatter plot of the ensemble synthetic control estimate of the output loss by 2018 (in % relative
to 2015). The underlying regression partials out NUTS1 region fixed effects.
38
Figure 7: Mechanism driving Brexit-vote output losses: Employment- and payroll growth despite falling output per
worker
Panel A: Employment growth Panel B: Real Payroll growth
Panel C: Productivity declines
Notes: Figure plots a binned scatter plot of the ensemble synthetic control estimate of the output loss by 2018 (in % relative to 2015) on the horizontal axis against real
employment growth (in %) relative to 2015 in panel A; real wage growth in % relative to 2015 in panel B and real changes in output per worker in % in panel C. The
underlying regressions are all statistically significant at the 1% level and control for NUTS1 region fixed effects with coefficients presented in Appendix Table 10.
39
Table 1: Region Level Brexit-vote Cost Estimates from Quarterly Data for 2018 and 2019
Ensemble estimate implied by “best synthetic control”
Region Ensemble Lower CI Upper CI yˆENSsimd AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
Panel A: Based on quarterly data (average for) 2018
North East -2.31 -3.09 -1.53 -2.37 -2.46 -1.80 -0.76
North West -1.04 -1.45 -0.63 -0.99 -1.71 -1.67 -1.15
Yorkshire & ... -1.03 -1.56 -0.50 -1.04 -1.41 -1.88 -2.00
East Midlands -2.33 -2.98 -1.68 -2.26 -3.63 -3.50 -3.63
West Midlands -2.37 -2.98 -1.75 -2.31 -3.57 -3.56 -1.07
East -0.33 -0.92 0.25 -0.29 -0.86 -0.91 -1.70
London -3.83 -4.61 -3.05 -3.81 -3.47 -4.57 -4.81
South East -3.45 -4.10 -2.80 -3.46 -3.88 -3.45 -3.52
South West -2.55 -3.21 -1.89 -2.45 -2.77 -3.82 -3.34
Northern Ireland -4.03 -4.58 -3.48 -4.03 -4.81 -4.55 -4.52
Scotland -2.09 -2.47 -1.72 -2.09 -2.67 -2.67 -2.74
Wales -1.49 -2.04 -0.94 -1.54 -0.56 -0.94 -0.72
Panel B: Based on quarterly data (average for) 2019
North East -2.96 -3.74 -2.18 -3.06 -3.40 -1.88 -1.02
North West -2.27 -2.67 -1.86 -2.22 -2.77 -2.97 -2.58
Yorkshire & ... -1.59 -2.12 -1.07 -1.57 -2.33 -2.82 -2.59
East Midlands -2.73 -3.38 -2.08 -2.65 -4.59 -4.01 -4.59
West Midlands -5.29 -5.90 -4.68 -5.25 -6.88 -6.88 -3.74
East -2.74 -3.32 -2.16 -2.68 -3.37 -3.50 -4.83
London -1.59 -2.37 -0.81 -1.56 -0.87 -2.77 -2.89
South East -3.08 -3.73 -2.43 -3.11 -3.13 -2.57 -2.66
South West -3.50 -4.16 -2.84 -3.42 -3.60 -4.59 -4.55
Northern Ireland -4.67 -5.22 -4.11 -4.64 -5.41 -5.18 -5.42
Scotland -2.82 -3.20 -2.44 -2.80 -3.93 -3.93 -4.03
Wales -0.48 -1.03 0.07 -0.54 1.19 0.48 0.54
Notes: Table presents region-level estimates of the cost of Brexit expressed in the difference in growth rates relative to 2016Q2 between the
actual UK region and the synthetic control estimate. The data capture the average difference in the respective year indicated in the column
head. The preferred estimate is the ensemble average across the whole set of synthetic control estimates. We further provide the ensemble
estimate constructed using the 70 synthetic controls using the sampling approach, along with the estimates that are obtained when picking
the best series among the set of synthetic control according to the best pre-treatment fit as defined by equations (2)-(4).
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Table 2: Region Level Brexit-vote Cost Estimates from Quarterly Data in Real GVA for 2018
and 2019
Ensemble estimate implied by “best synthetic control”
Region Ensemble Lower CI Upper CI yˆENSsimd AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
Panel A: Based on quarterly data (average for) 2018
North East -1236 -1659 -817 -1271 -1321 -961 -406
North West -1856 -2590 -1126 -1764 -3059 -2980 -2054
Yorkshire & ... -1234 -1873 -599 -1243 -1695 -2268 -2418
East Midlands -2484 -3184 -1787 -2412 -3897 -3751 -3897
West Midlands -3277 -4134 -2425 -3205 -4971 -4967 -1479
East -542 -1477 387 -477 -1397 -1467 -2754
London -17056 -20608 -13531 -16973 -15399 -20446 -21526
South East -9421 -11241 -7612 -9444 -10602 -9425 -9600
South West -3489 -4407 -2577 -3358 -3805 -5276 -4594
Northern Ireland -1644 -1875 -1414 -1644 -1969 -1858 -1846
Scotland -2905 -3436 -2376 -2894 -3716 -3716 -3818
Wales -941 -1293 -592 -969 -350 -593 -453
UK combined -46085 -57777 -34467 -45654 -52181 -57707 -54845
Panel B: Based on quarterly data (average for) 2019
North East -1597 -2025 -1173 -1651 -1837 -1011 -545
North West -4061 -4803 -3322 -3968 -4976 -5340 -4631
Yorkshire & ... -1932 -2580 -1288 -1903 -2831 -3437 -3153
East Midlands -2950 -3660 -2243 -2865 -5001 -4361 -5001
West Midlands -7357 -8231 -6488 -7307 -9653 -9644 -5154
East -4423 -5377 -3474 -4329 -5462 -5666 -7873
London -7317 -10954 -3708 -7166 -4003 -12852 -13414
South East -8523 -10364 -6695 -8604 -8656 -7088 -7339
South West -4857 -5790 -3929 -4732 -4990 -6390 -6336
Northern Ireland -1922 -2156 -1689 -1912 -2235 -2140 -2243
Scotland -3955 -4493 -3418 -3921 -5545 -5545 -5684
Wales -307 -662 46 -347 755 304 345
UK combined -49201 -61096 -37383 -48705 -54433 -63169 -61027
Notes: Table presents region-level estimates of the cost of Brexit expressed in millions of real pounds of gross-value added in 2018. The
table aggregates the district level estimates. Losers, winners and ambigous cases are defined as per the classification in Section 4.2. The
preferred estimate is the ensemble average across the 31 synthetic control estimates. We further provide the ensemble estimate constructed
using the 70 synthetic controls using the sampling approach, along with the estimates that are obtained when picking the best series among
the 31 synthetic control according to the best pre-treatment fit as defined by equations (2)-(4).
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Table 3: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote for the ten districts with largest losses and
the 5 districts with most gains in per capita real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates in £million
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
North East Darlington Loser 5782 54548 -1180 -20.10 -11133 -1409 -959 -1029 -1161 -1161 -1316
London Islington Loser 17759 78059 -2209 -11.49 -9711 -2406 -2014 -1861 -2708 -3195 -3195
London Tower Hamlets Loser 31190 106151 -2809 -8.23 -9559 -3403 -2225 -2924 -4500 -4500 -5749
Scotland Aberdeen City Loser 11351 49277 -2062 -18.19 -8951 -2445 -1690 -2802 -3043 -3043 -1155
South East Reigate &Banst... Loser 7071 49175 -1263 -19.38 -8783 -1462 -1070 -1258 -1302 -1302 -1302
East Broxbourne Loser 2671 27733 -712 -26.39 -7390 -807 -619 -620 -789 -779 -789
South East Mole Valley Loser 4007 46069 -589 -14.87 -6766 -740 -442 -742 -459 -459 -459
W Midlands East Staffords... Loser 3829 32953 -786 -21.74 -6760 -887 -687 -757 -798 -790 -767
London Kensington &Ch... Loser 10183 64210 -1066 -9.92 -6721 -1520 -629 -1413 -887 -887 -887
Scotland Shetl&Islands Loser 794 34224 -154 -19.86 -6628 -173 -135 -161 -131 -142 -142
North East North Tyneside Winner 7550 37243 1048 12.62 5168 862 1229 898 1263 1193 1193
South East Wokingham Winner 5846 36266 1021 15.20 6332 928 1112 894 1184 1184 1234
W Midlands Solihull Winner 7659 36327 1607 18.34 7621 1366 1840 1732 1485 1485 1485
East Three Rivers Winner 3485 37964 704 16.49 7670 498 900 855 586 586 586
London Westminster Winner 56957 239268 3034 4.69 12747 2162 3895 2883 111 70 70
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Table 4: Region Level Aggregated District Level Brexit-vote Cost Estimates in Real GVA in 2018
# of districts classified as District-level aggregation implied by “best synthetic control”
Region losers winners unclear Ensemble Lower CI Upper CI yˆENSsimd AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
North East 6 3 3 -4450 -6506 -2440 -4384 -3134 -3352 -3739
North West 19 11 9 -2902 -6154 269 -1760 -2462 -2782 -3076
Yorkshire & ... 5 5 11 -1276 -3032 448 -683 -1231 -1111 -885
East Midlands 16 4 20 -3863 -5651 -2116 -3136 -4173 -4225 -3897
West Midlands 10 11 9 644 -2555 3748 1837 1044 660 28
East 13 17 16 1419 -2049 4794 3409 2171 1637 1725
London 19 4 10 -12321 -20831 -4001 -11237 -19712 -21462 -19785
South East 39 8 20 -13193 -18869 -7659 -12582 -11634 -11753 -12640
South West 12 6 11 -1948 -4156 216 -2118 -2058 -2366 -2071
Wales 10 5 7 -508 -1658 617 -672 61 25 26
Scotland 17 1 14 -6008 -8526 -3539 -6683 -6933 -6677 -4416
Northern Ireland 2 3 6 -1289 -2093 -507 -718 -1495 -1392 -1318
UK combined 168 78 136 -45695 -82079 -10169 -38728 -49557 -52799 -50049
Notes: Table presents region-level estimates of the cost of Brexit expressed in millions of real pounds of gross-value added in 2018. The table
aggregates the district level estimates. Losers, winners and ambigous cases are defined as per the classification in Section 4.2. The preferred
estimate is the ensemble average across the 31 synthetic control estimates. We further provide the ensemble estimate constructed using the 70
synthetic controls using the sampling approach, along with the estimates that are obtained when picking the best series among the 31 synthetic
control according to the best pre-treatment fit as defined by equations (2)-(4).
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Table 5: Correlation between 2010-2015 district-level sector average Gross Value Added and the estimated loss in GVA by 2018
relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






Wholesale and Retail -17.213
(12.750)
Transportation and Storage -13.405
(8.609)
Public, education, health -5.201
(5.604)
Finance and Insurance 10.504
(6.408)
Professional, scientific, technical and other services 20.229*
(10.952)
Mean of DV -2.9 -2.83 -2.83 -2.83 -2.83 -2.85 -2.85 -2.85
R2 .0879 .103 .0934 .0967 .0961 .0934 .0979 .1
Local authority districts 381 422 422 422 422 420 420 420
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate of the output gap in percent relative to 2015.
The ensemble has been constructed from 31 synthetic controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Robust standard errors are provided in the
parentheses. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table 6: Correlation between 2011 census level sector and district-level employment shares at the estimated loss in GVA by 2018
relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agriculture and Mining employment share (2011) -46.647**
(18.241)
Manufacturing employment share (2011) -35.253***
(12.630)
Construction employment share (2011) -36.278
(27.176)
Retail employment share (2011) -0.733
(21.142)
Hotel/Restaurant employment share (2011) -11.869
(19.505)
Transport employment share (2011) 20.627
(17.041)
Finance employment share (2011) 32.120*
(16.676)
Other Service sector employment share (2011) 19.034*
(9.785)
Mean of DV -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03
R2 .0918 .0982 .0857 .0804 .0812 .0838 .0898 .0903
Local authority districts 370 370 370 370 370 370 370 370
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate of the output gap in percent relative to 2015. The ensemble
has been constructed from 31 synthetic controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Robust standard errors are provided in the parentheses. Stars
indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table 7: Correlation between 2010-2015 district-level sector average Gross Value Added and the estimated loss in GVA by 2018
relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)






Wholesale and Retail -17.213
(12.750)
Transportation and Storage -13.405
(8.609)
Public, education, health -5.201
(5.604)
Finance and Insurance 10.504
(6.408)
Professional, scientific, technical and other services 20.229*
(10.952)
Mean of DV -2.9 -2.83 -2.83 -2.83 -2.83 -2.85 -2.85 -2.85
R2 .0879 .103 .0934 .0967 .0961 .0934 .0979 .1
Local authority districts 381 422 422 422 422 420 420 420
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate of the output gap in percent relative to 2015.
The ensemble has been constructed from 31 synthetic controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Robust standard errors are provided in the
parentheses. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table 8: Correlation between hourly pay levels, inequality and changes from 2005 to 2015 and the estimated
loss in GVA by 2018 relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean hourly pay (2015) 0.331**
(0.168)
Median hourly pay (2015) 0.455*
(0.253)
Interquartile range hourly pay (2015) 0.374**
(0.164)
10th percentile hourly pay growth (2015-2005) -9.132*
(4.828)
25th percentile hourly pay growth (2015-2005) -3.334
(4.828)
Mean hourly pay growth (2015-2005) -1.876
(1.590)
Median hourly pay growth (2015-2005) -5.284
(4.612)
Mean of DV -3.03 -3.03 -2.95 -2.99 -3.02 -3.03 -3.03
R2 .0914 .0909 .0912 .0891 .0817 .0821 .0836
Local authority districts 370 370 364 367 369 370 370
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate of the output gap in percent
relative to 2015. The ensemble has been constructed from 31 synthetic controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Robust
standard errors are provided in the parentheses. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table 9: Correlation between other social- and economic characteristics and the estimated loss in GVA by 2018 relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of Res. Pop. No Qualification (2011) -18.404**
(7.912)
Share of Res. Pop. Qualification 4+ (2011) 11.694**
(5.843)
Unemployment rate APS (2015) 0.014
(0.172)
Self-employment rate APS (2015) 0.224**
(0.102)
Unemployment rate increase 2007-2009 0.351*
(0.187)
Migrant Stock from EU8 Accesssion countries (2011) -57.817**
(27.828)
Migrant Stock from EU15 countries (2011) 8.166
(32.832)
Migrant Stock Non-EU (2011) -3.166
(7.251)
Mean of DV -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.1 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03
R2 .0945 .0909 .0816 .0914 .0926 .0908 .0805 .0807
Local authority districts 370 370 368 368 336 370 370 370
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate of the output gap in percent relative to 2015.
The ensemble has been constructed from 31 synthetic controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Robust standard errors are provided in the
parentheses. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Table 10: Mechanisms: Employment and Payroll Growth and Productivity
Losses point towards capital decumulation
(1) (2) (3)
Real growth relative to 2015 in
Employment Payroll Output per worker
Brexit-vote output loss in % -0.274*** -0.132*** -0.568***
(0.044) (0.038) (0.053)
Mean of DV 2.8 6.47 1.05
R2 .186 .235 .358
Local authority districts 362 377 362
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region fixed effects. The regression coefficient capture
the impact of a 1 percentage point lower growth of a district vis-a-vis its respective ensemble
synthetic control estimate on real employment growth in % relative to 2015 in column (1);
real payroll growth in % relative to 2015 in column (2) and real changes in output per worker
in % in column (3). Robust standard errors are provided in the parentheses. Stars indicate
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Figure A1: Average District-Level Real GVA Output Gap in % relative to 2015 By
2018 Across Regions
Notes: Figure plots the average output loss, comparing the difference between the UK realised real GDP relative to 2015 and
the ensemble estimate of the synthetic control using the ensemble. The estimated coefficients are computed by a regression
of the output gap on region dummies, which are presented here, and bars correspond to the 90% confidence intervals.
2
Figure A2: Relationship between economic structure and Brexit-vote output losses emerges post 2016: Exploring
Manufacturing and Some Services
Census employment shares (2011)
Manufacturing Other Services Sector
Sector level gross-value added share (2010-2015)
Manufacturing Professional, scientific, technical services
Notes: Figures present results from estimating regression specification 5 for each year, plotting out the coefficient β that is estimated for each year. The figure highlights that
the increasing gap between the synthetic control and actual recorded output is only emerging after the Brexit vote. 90% confidence intervals are indicated constructed from
estimating clustered standard errors at the district level.
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Figure A3: Share of employees furloughed as of May 2020 due to COVID19 and
Brexit-vote output losses by 2018 across districts
Notes: Figures present results from a binned scatter plot regression, controlling for NUTS1 region fixed effects. The
regression line indicates that for every one percentage point lower output due to the Brexit-vote vis-a-vis a the ensemble
synthetic control estimate the share of employees currently furloughed is 0.15 percentage points higher. This relationship is
significant at the one percent level using robust standard errors.
4
Table A1: UK-level estimates of Brexit-vote cost to date using synthetic controls con-
structed from various donor pools in this paper and Born et al. (2019)
Brexit cost estimates quality of pre Brexit fit
Donor Pool # Gap Upper Lower GBP bn AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
EU 27 -4.46 -3.97 -4.94 -87.23 0.39 0.23 0.06
G20 18 -1.49 -0.62 -2.35 -29.13 0.67 0.71 0.12
OECD 33 -2.75 -2.43 -3.06 -53.80 0.25 0.10 0.04
G20, EU 42 -2.26 -1.94 -2.57 -44.22 0.23 0.09 0.05
G20, OECD 41 -2.77 -2.45 -3.09 -54.22 0.25 0.10 0.04
OECD, EU 40 -2.55 -2.26 -2.84 -49.88 0.22 0.08 0.04
G20, OECD, EU 48 -2.55 -2.26 -2.84 -49.90 0.22 0.08 0.04
Ensemble yˆENSd -2.28 -2.02 -2.54 -44.67 0.14 0.03 0.02
Ensemble yˆENSsimd -1.97 -1.32 -2.63 -38.63 0.38 0.21 0.06
RMSPEd -2.76 -2.70 -2.81 -54.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
AAPEd -2.14 -2.09 -2.20 -42.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
MAPEd -2.76 -2.70 -2.81 -54.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
Notes: Table shows Brexit cost at the national level. These are the results when constructing synthetic controls using the various
donor pools indicated from Annual Real Gross Value Added data (Panel A). ”#” refer to the number of units in the donor pool
set. ”Gap” is the estimated cost of Brexit expressed in percentage drop in real 2015 GDP. ”Upper” and ”Lower” being the upper
and lower limits of the confidence intervals. ”GBP bn” translates into real billion pounds. Finally, MAPEs, RMSPEs, AAPEs are
measures of goodness of fit, see Equations (2)-(4).
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Table A2: Total Sets of Combinations of Donor Pools
Pool 1 Size 1 Pool 2 Size 2 Pool 3 Size 3 Pool 4 Size 4 Pool 5 Size 5
EU-NUTS2 175 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES 226 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES G20 241 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES G20 OECD 250 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES G20 OECD EU 253
US-STATES 51 EU-NUTS2 G20 191 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES OECD 242 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES G20 EU 247
G20 18 EU-NUTS2 OECD 192 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES EU 233 EU-NUTS2 US-STATES OECD EU 245
OECD 33 EU-NUTS2 EU 182 EU-NUTS2 G20 OECD 200 EU-NUTS2 G20 OECD EU 203
EU 27 US-STATES G20 68 EU-NUTS2 G20 EU 197 US-STATES G20 OECD EU 98
US-STATES OECD 83 EU-NUTS2 OECD EU 195
US-STATES EU 78 US-STATES G20 OECD 91
G20 OECD 41 US-STATES G20 EU 92
G20 EU 42 US-STATES OECD EU 90
OECD EU 40 G20 OECD EU 48
Notes: Table presents full set of potential combinations of donor pools drawn from the set of five potential donor sets. Cells colored light blue include donor pools only constructed of subnational data; cells colored light red include
only country-level donors; non-colored cells capture a donor pool set comprised of a mix of country-level and subnational data. The counts indicated in the columns with the respective sizes represent the maximum number of
spatial units included in the respective donor pool.
6
Table A3: District-Level “best model” selected from the set of 31 synthetic controls constructed
for each district
Donor pool implied by “best synthetic control”
Donor pool set Type Size RMSPEs AAPEs MAPEs
NUTS2 Subnational only 1.00 0 0 0
US States Subnational only 1.00 0 0 0
G20 Country only 1.00 0 0 0
OECD Country only 1.00 0 0 0
EU Country only 1.00 1 1 5
NUTS2, US States Subnational only 2.00 27 25 41
NUTS2, G20 Mixed 2.00 0 0 0
NUTS2, OECD Mixed 2.00 0 0 0
NUTS2, EU Mixed 2.00 0 0 0
US States, G20 Mixed 2.00 2 8 7
US States, OECD Mixed 2.00 9 12 12
US States, EU Mixed 2.00 21 14 18
G20, OECD Country only 2.00 0 0 0
G20, EU Country only 2.00 0 0 0
OECD, EU Country only 2.00 0 0 0
NUTS2, US States, G20 Mixed 3.00 25 39 21
NUTS2, US States, G20 Mixed 3.00 25 39 21
NUTS2, US States, OECD Mixed 3.00 22 24 12
NUTS2, US States, EU Mixed 3.00 40 33 36
NUTS2, G20, OECD Mixed 3.00 1 2 0
NUTS2, G20, EU Mixed 3.00 1 1 1
NUTS2, OECD, EU Mixed 3.00 0 0 0
US States, G20, OECD Mixed 3.00 6 10 15
US States, G20, EU Mixed 3.00 18 22 19
US States, OECD, EU Mixed 3.00 16 12 21
G20, OECD, EU Country only 3.00 2 2 3
NUTS2, US States, G20, OECD Mixed 4.00 38 33 33
NUTS2, US States, G20, EU Mixed 4.00 44 44 34
NUTS2, US States, OECD, EU Mixed 4.00 36 35 31
NUTS2, G20, OECD, EU Mixed 4.00 1 1 2
NUTS2, G20, OECD, EU Mixed 4.00 1 1 2
US States, G20, OECD, EU Mixed 4.00 14 17 17
NUTS2, US States, G20, OECD, EU Mixed 5.00 58 40 27
Notes: Table presents the number of districts whose “best fit” has been determined according to equations (2)-(4)
from the set of 31 synthetic control candidates tabulated against the respective donor pools.
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Table A4: Characteristics of districts classified as Brexit-vote losers or winners
Overall Losers Unclear Winners
Mean Mean p Mean p Mean p
Panel A: Output losses
Output loss relative to yEnsd -2.83 -8.54 0.00 -0.78 0.00 6.43 0.00
( 6.95) ( 4.96) ( 2.13) ( 4.02)
Output loss relative to yENSsimd -2.32 -8.34 0.00 -0.39 0.00 7.29 0.00
( 7.20) ( 4.90) ( 1.93) ( 4.31)
Output loss relative to yMAPEd -2.62 -8.40 0.00 -0.50 0.00 6.70 0.00
( 7.32) ( 5.23) ( 3.17) ( 4.86)
Output loss relative to yAAPEd -2.68 -8.50 0.00 -0.45 0.00 6.50 0.00
( 7.38) ( 5.64) ( 2.90) ( 4.60)
Output loss relative to yRMSEd -2.81 -8.58 0.00 -0.65 0.00 6.38 0.00
( 7.36) ( 5.64) ( 2.90) ( 4.63)
Panel B: EU preferences
% Leave in 2016 Referendum 47.72 47.31 0.69 45.86 0.12 52.11 0.01
( 18.41) ( 19.11) ( 18.71) ( 15.47)
% Turnout in 2016 66.33 65.22 0.36 65.31 0.49 70.75 0.01
( 22.12) ( 22.88) ( 23.46) ( 16.88)
Panel C: Demographics (2011)
Share with No Qualification (2011) 0.31 0.31 0.63 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.52
( 0.05) ( 0.06) ( 0.05) ( 0.06)
Share with Qualification 4+ (2011) 0.27 0.27 0.71 0.27 0.50 0.27 0.74
( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.08)
Population 0 - 19 yrs 0.25 0.25 0.42 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.50
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Population 20 - 29 yrs 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.54 0.11 0.01
( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.02)
Population 30 - 44 yrs (2011) 0.22 0.23 0.70 0.22 0.61 0.22 0.91
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Population 45 - 59 yrs (2011) 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.84 0.20 0.05
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Population 60 older (2011) 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.22 0.53 0.22 0.64
( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.04)
Panel D: Incomes
Median hourly pay (2015) 13.49 13.47 0.87 13.46 0.84 13.59 0.66
( 2.14) ( 2.08) ( 2.19) ( 2.20)
Mean hourly pay (2015) 16.12 16.10 0.87 16.02 0.63 16.36 0.44
( 2.92) ( 2.99) ( 2.81) ( 2.98)
Unemployment rate increase 2007-2009 2.31 2.10 0.12 2.26 0.76 2.87 0.02
( 2.29) ( 2.35) ( 2.25) ( 2.18)
Unemployment rate APS (2015) 5.27 5.29 0.89 5.27 0.98 5.24 0.90
( 2.11) ( 2.12) ( 2.02) ( 2.28)
Panel E: Employment shares (2011)
Agriculture & Mining 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.01 0.74 0.01 0.08
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.01)
Manufacturing 0.09 0.09 0.97 0.09 0.75 0.09 0.65
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.03)
Construction 0.08 0.08 0.65 0.08 0.41 0.08 0.68
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Retail 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.76 0.16 0.17
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Hotel/Restaurant 0.06 0.06 0.69 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.08
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Transport & Storage 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.97
( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.02)
Finance 0.04 0.04 0.36 0.04 0.51 0.04 0.71
( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.03) ( 0.02)
Other Service sector 0.46 0.46 0.69 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.76
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
Notes: Table presents summary statistics for the three districts classified into Brexit-vote winners, losers and ambigous
using the method presented in section 4.2. The respective overall and group-level means are presented with the p-
values indicating whether a group-specific mean is statistically different from the overall mean.
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
North East Hartlepool Winner 2618 28303 77 2.84 838 30 125 94 125 110 110
North East Middlesbrough Winner 5254 37714 279 4.99 2001 228 329 265 393 378 409
North East Redcar &Clevel... Loser 3596 26573 -578 -16.46 -4273 -657 -501 -586 -597 -550 -660
North East Stockton-on-Te... Loser 9796 50203 -1085 -11.05 -5558 -1180 -990 -1108 -995 -1044 -1000
North East Darlington Loser 5782 54548 -1180 -20.10 -11133 -1409 -959 -1029 -1161 -1161 -1316
North East County Durham - 16714 32183 -17 -0.10 -34 -203 166 -247 41 41 40
North East Northumberland Loser 10102 31923 -826 -8.15 -2609 -969 -684 -605 -686 -686 -690
North East Newcastle upon... - 17174 59065 -211 -1.21 -727 -489 62 -491 356 333 336
North East North Tyneside Winner 7550 37243 1048 12.62 5168 862 1229 898 1263 1193 1193
North East South Tyneside Loser 3850 25927 -665 -17.14 -4477 -750 -581 -655 -664 -595 -631
North East Sunderland - 13592 49102 -631 -4.33 -2278 -1006 -264 -369 -734 -734 -892
North East Gateshead Loser 8040 39856 -661 -7.97 -3277 -961 -371 -552 -476 -637 -637
North West Halton Winner 3857 30437 199 4.80 1573 137 261 150 221 221 202
North West Warrington Loser 7040 33882 -697 -9.26 -3353 -840 -556 -517 -821 -714 -727
North West Blackburn with... - 2927 19796 -163 -5.19 -1100 -209 -117 -56 -214 -215 -213
North West Blackpool Winner 2411 17202 190 7.22 1353 81 294 243 187 187 187
North West Cheshire East - 12880 34281 -118 -0.82 -314 -650 395 102 192 45 -250
North West Cheshire West ... - 8855 26516 304 3.21 909 194 412 169 410 436 436
North West Allerdale Loser 1943 20081 -374 -19.34 -3870 -419 -331 -339 -395 -414 -414
North West Barrow-in-Furn... Loser 1557 23007 -74 -4.49 -1090 -144 -6 -114 -25 -25 -141
North West Carlisle Loser 2782 25733 -382 -13.08 -3534 -429 -336 -312 -361 -367 -431
North West Copeland Loser 1703 24437 -264 -15.79 -3786 -324 -206 -304 -255 -260 -220
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
North West Eden Loser 1393 26495 -100 -6.93 -1894 -125 -75 -88 -103 -103 -103
North West Burnley Winner 1964 22507 66 2.99 758 34 98 93 29 57 79
North West Chorley Winner 1882 16660 57 2.87 505 25 88 68 60 77 75
North West Fylde Winner 1870 24132 64 3.18 823 -68 188 102 70 73 73
North West Hyndburn Loser 1539 19210 -216 -13.82 -2700 -233 -200 -205 -230 -230 -230
North West Lancaster Loser 2709 19242 -282 -10.14 -2004 -413 -157 -228 -313 -353 -353
North West Pendle Loser 2232 24821 -214 -9.35 -2384 -299 -133 -164 -238 -238 -238
North West Preston - 4012 28518 126 2.97 896 84 168 100 167 187 184
North West Ribble Valley Loser 1481 25308 -119 -7.47 -2029 -163 -76 -111 -82 -82 -137
North West Rossendale Loser 1109 15976 -115 -10.15 -1655 -132 -98 -115 -111 -108 -110
North West South Ribble - 3371 30733 -247 -6.62 -2253 -422 -80 -59 -301 -365 -372
North West West Lancashir... Winner 2243 19941 173 7.24 1540 145 201 179 195 192 188
North West Wyre - 1530 13967 -4 -0.28 -40 -35 26 3 6 8 15
North West Bolton Winner 5435 19285 157 2.67 557 85 228 289 20 9 42
North West Bury - 3010 16029 22 0.73 119 -29 73 -45 80 80 72
North West Manchester Winner 19382 36583 997 4.69 1882 892 1102 863 1010 935 935
North West Oldham Loser 3485 15139 -186 -5.07 -809 -225 -148 -102 -184 -235 -235
North West Rochdale Loser 3346 15613 -160 -4.76 -746 -212 -109 -162 -140 -146 -156
North West Salford Loser 7206 29390 -687 -8.88 -2803 -852 -525 -587 -629 -618 -597
North West Stockport Winner 5955 20665 339 5.35 1177 271 407 325 429 366 369
North West Tameside Loser 3302 14907 -329 -9.70 -1485 -366 -293 -285 -316 -314 -290
North West Trafford Winner 7958 34158 324 3.75 1391 226 421 358 191 229 273
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
North West Wigan Loser 4995 15501 -321 -6.20 -997 -407 -237 -190 -428 -429 -429
North West Knowsley Winner 3245 22036 33 0.92 225 -19 85 119 41 26 26
North West Liverpool Loser 12719 26450 -408 -3.11 -849 -607 -213 -517 -264 -366 -297
North West St. Helens Loser 2709 15254 -190 -6.85 -1069 -221 -159 -132 -185 -185 -191
North West Sefton - 3863 14094 27 0.66 99 -48 101 91 -3 4 47
North West Wirral Loser 4918 15288 -340 -6.83 -1056 -404 -276 -330 -217 -206 -206
North West South Lakeland - 2440 23512 10 0.39 93 -34 52 -52 45 60 60
E Midlands Derby Loser 6747 26576 -290 -4.15 -1144 -396 -187 -324 -392 -392 -256
E Midlands Leicester Loser 7768 22579 -553 -6.74 -1608 -631 -476 -522 -463 -545 -545
E Midlands Rutland - 710 18513 1 0.08 15 -19 19 12 6 3 3
E Midlands Nottingham Loser 9535 29896 -939 -9.28 -2944 -1017 -861 -830 -1004 -984 -984
E Midlands Amber Valley - 2355 18963 -63 -2.52 -506 -94 -32 -10 -91 -94 -94
E Midlands Bolsover Loser 1808 23204 -154 -7.91 -1972 -193 -115 -106 -192 -193 -190
E Midlands Chesterfield - 2244 21481 -61 -2.59 -586 -98 -25 -69 -109 -81 -81
E Midlands Derbyshire Dal... Winner 1326 18597 87 5.88 1214 -13 180 93 84 53 53
E Midlands Erewash - 1480 12905 -10 -0.67 -90 -31 10 -7 -23 -14 1
E Midlands High Peak - 1368 14947 1 0.08 12 -33 34 29 -19 -19 -19
E Midlands North East Der... Loser 1358 13626 -150 -10.60 -1501 -176 -124 -119 -150 -141 -153
E Midlands South Derbyshi... Loser 2449 24651 -430 -16.68 -4331 -582 -286 -403 -367 -367 -454
E Midlands Blaby - 3422 35477 29 0.79 301 -33 90 -52 40 40 40
E Midlands Charnwood - 3270 18668 59 1.73 338 0 117 78 72 70 71
E Midlands Harborough - 1980 22211 -20 -0.99 -229 -74 32 18 -71 -93 -100
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
E Midlands Hinckley &Bosw... Loser 2215 20395 -261 -11.02 -2407 -304 -220 -196 -233 -233 -274
E Midlands Melton - 1130 22176 15 1.31 303 -8 38 30 33 -5 -8
E Midlands North West Lei... - 3262 33595 -126 -3.45 -1295 -175 -77 -39 -142 -142 -40
E Midlands Oadby &Wigston Loser 845 15094 -54 -6.39 -957 -71 -37 -53 -41 -50 -35
E Midlands Boston Loser 1335 19962 -127 -8.89 -1895 -158 -96 -107 -145 -151 -149
E Midlands East Lindsey Loser 2140 15500 -176 -8.23 -1276 -215 -138 -165 -198 -187 -187
E Midlands Lincoln Loser 2632 27235 -130 -4.71 -1344 -168 -92 -141 -142 -127 -142
E Midlands North Kesteven - 2046 18238 15 0.67 130 -17 46 17 64 -27 -17
E Midlands South Holland Winner 1818 19924 106 5.25 1157 65 146 117 130 102 118
E Midlands South Kesteven Loser 2655 19049 -126 -4.60 -906 -175 -78 -155 -95 -95 -95
E Midlands West Lindsey Loser 1403 15093 -121 -8.12 -1305 -156 -87 -86 -159 -155 -155
E Midlands Corby - 1453 21723 -3 -0.16 -39 -20 14 17 -22 -1 -1
E Midlands Daventry Winner 1963 24601 146 6.68 1825 118 173 166 168 138 140
E Midlands East Northampt... - 1258 13966 5 0.38 56 -7 17 26 13 23 -7
E Midlands Kettering - 1971 20194 16 0.77 168 -9 41 -22 51 64 76
E Midlands Northampton Loser 6946 31358 -454 -6.01 -2051 -517 -392 -342 -615 -545 -504
E Midlands South Northamp... - 1739 19516 -36 -1.91 -407 -64 -9 -0 -39 -41 -13
E Midlands Wellingborough - 1653 21413 -23 -1.32 -300 -38 -8 -10 -28 -20 -30
E Midlands Ashfield Loser 2518 20376 -284 -10.48 -2300 -352 -218 -223 -321 -320 -307
E Midlands Bassetlaw Loser 2111 18406 -47 -2.16 -409 -72 -22 -58 -55 -57 -26
E Midlands Broxtowe - 2285 20432 13 0.55 117 -36 61 21 35 35 35
E Midlands Gedling - 1649 14198 -15 -0.87 -127 -100 66 8 5 5 53
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
E Midlands Mansfield - 1455 13626 0 0.00 0 -12 12 -4 -15 -18 -6
E Midlands Newark &Sherwo... - 2272 19141 36 1.50 300 9 62 15 60 60 84
E Midlands Rushcliffe Winner 2056 17957 263 11.37 2300 218 308 263 195 279 298
W Midlands Herefordshire,... Loser 3775 20024 -313 -7.95 -1663 -450 -181 -290 -358 -358 -172
W Midlands Telford &Wreki... Winner 3680 21436 845 19.74 4925 750 938 891 862 862 862
W Midlands Stoke-on-Trent Winner 4880 19385 322 6.16 1280 292 353 190 387 387 391
W Midlands Shropshire - 5732 18358 -13 -0.22 -42 -74 47 -44 122 67 -81
W Midlands Cannock Chase - 1951 19809 -50 -2.43 -513 -104 1 -4 -77 -67 -77
W Midlands East Staffords... Loser 3829 32953 -786 -21.74 -6760 -887 -687 -757 -798 -790 -767
W Midlands Lichfield Loser 2313 22551 -226 -9.72 -2203 -330 -126 -132 -189 -173 -189
W Midlands Newcastle-unde... Loser 2107 16608 -163 -7.58 -1282 -182 -143 -159 -168 -168 -180
W Midlands South Stafford... Winner 1533 13847 171 10.27 1544 142 199 170 157 157 176
W Midlands Stafford - 2812 21268 86 2.80 647 31 139 47 155 155 155
W Midlands Staffordshire ... Loser 1415 14437 -70 -4.73 -718 -96 -46 -69 -66 -61 -61
W Midlands Tamworth Winner 1339 17365 90 6.12 1171 68 113 124 111 105 105
W Midlands North Warwicks... Winner 2522 40182 215 7.81 3425 139 289 182 239 239 275
W Midlands Nuneaton &Bedw... Loser 2048 16177 -174 -7.88 -1377 -291 -63 -163 -36 -59 -59
W Midlands Rugby Winner 2707 25915 188 6.40 1803 126 249 146 234 234 88
W Midlands Stratford-on-A... Winner 4215 34426 187 4.02 1530 58 313 157 264 240 134
W Midlands Warwick - 5486 39498 -65 -1.05 -468 -248 112 89 242 -62 -311
W Midlands Bromsgrove Winner 2460 25678 142 5.47 1481 30 249 130 167 173 167
W Midlands Malvern Hills - 1440 18914 -20 -1.33 -263 -50 10 -36 -3 -3 -3
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
W Midlands Redditch Loser 2063 24322 -227 -10.03 -2677 -329 -129 -141 -354 -277 -277
W Midlands Worcester Loser 3032 30024 -452 -15.31 -4480 -509 -396 -487 -357 -357 -421
W Midlands Wychavon - 2426 19933 -11 -0.43 -91 -41 19 -9 -5 -19 -27
W Midlands Wyre Forest - 1349 13544 7 0.49 70 -11 24 14 7 6 6
W Midlands Birmingham - 25735 23123 298 1.07 267 -63 653 738 12 -62 -177
W Midlands Coventry Loser 9305 27027 -1119 -11.53 -3249 -1356 -887 -953 -1076 -1076 -1216
W Midlands Dudley Winner 4826 15256 346 6.60 1095 243 447 416 384 378 378
W Midlands Sandwell Winner 5421 16988 328 5.57 1028 114 534 438 185 185 185
W Midlands Solihull Winner 7659 36327 1607 18.34 7621 1366 1840 1732 1485 1485 1485
W Midlands Walsall Loser 4400 15949 -390 -8.59 -1415 -475 -307 -349 -408 -408 -288
W Midlands Wolverhampton - 4213 16515 -109 -2.38 -426 -420 183 -36 -73 -73 -73
East Peterborough Winner 5172 26707 744 12.39 3841 605 879 890 696 696 880
East Luton Loser 5579 26121 -429 -6.99 -2011 -660 -207 -131 -626 -626 -626
East Southend-on-Se... Loser 2832 15801 -83 -2.84 -461 -104 -61 -108 -49 -54 -58
East Thurrock Winner 3555 21411 232 6.04 1396 137 324 343 224 237 241
East Bedford - 3731 22425 46 1.14 274 -18 108 109 35 35 -1
East Central Bedfor... Winner 5383 19760 415 6.73 1524 336 493 501 488 348 348
East Cambridge Loser 5921 47328 -401 -6.49 -3207 -518 -287 -436 -27 -27 -301
East East Cambridge... - 1791 20403 -60 -3.20 -685 -97 -24 -34 -26 -25 -37
East Fenland Loser 1733 17538 -94 -5.08 -947 -130 -58 -128 -28 -43 -24
East Huntingdonshir... Winner 3977 22682 98 2.29 559 72 124 120 132 103 103
East South Cambridg... Winner 4488 29051 558 10.98 3610 518 597 495 571 571 616
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
East Basildon - 5349 29398 -144 -2.47 -791 -259 -31 -66 -120 -120 -58
East Braintree Winner 2967 19710 317 9.57 2106 221 410 380 378 344 344
East Brentwood - 2898 37930 -162 -5.08 -2120 -292 -37 -62 -20 -120 -120
East Castle Point Loser 1000 11213 -43 -4.14 -477 -63 -23 -35 -43 -42 -26
East Chelmsford - 4471 25886 -66 -1.39 -381 -171 37 -31 -153 -74 53
East Colchester - 3860 20874 -74 -1.83 -403 -130 -19 -49 -50 -65 -63
East Epping Forest Winner 3188 24661 662 18.18 5122 587 736 733 777 777 849
East Harlow Winner 2019 23660 62 2.87 727 -61 178 89 65 65 65
East Maldon Winner 958 15249 28 2.72 440 -0 55 38 31 33 40
East Rochford Loser 1090 12795 -52 -4.52 -609 -78 -27 -48 -16 -16 -16
East Tendring - 1674 11806 10 0.54 69 -29 48 27 -14 -14 -14
East Uttlesford Loser 2137 25081 -47 -2.16 -554 -84 -11 -80 -6 -6 -6
East Broxbourne Loser 2671 27733 -712 -26.39 -7390 -807 -619 -620 -789 -779 -789
East Dacorum Winner 3812 25234 303 7.31 2007 256 350 364 269 269 270
East Hertsmere Winner 3598 34879 227 5.59 2198 141 311 327 122 171 171
East North Hertford... Winner 3047 23152 221 6.81 1682 173 269 234 201 201 203
East Three Rivers Winner 3485 37964 704 16.49 7670 498 900 855 586 586 586
East Watford - 4461 46301 -95 -1.86 -989 -247 52 89 -155 -36 137
East Breckland Loser 2258 16640 -151 -6.37 -1115 -199 -105 -139 -167 -167 -167
East Broadland Winner 2763 21820 165 5.39 1304 122 208 182 239 197 121
East Great Yarmouth Loser 1984 20119 -395 -20.70 -4002 -421 -368 -455 -354 -354 -355
East King’s Lynn &W... - 2841 18782 -15 -0.53 -102 -43 11 -95 46 46 47
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
East North Norfolk - 1478 14314 -14 -0.89 -132 -30 3 -27 -2 1 -2
East Norwich - 3905 28277 -93 -2.22 -673 -156 -31 -87 -17 -17 -100
East South Norfolk Loser 2508 19116 -158 -6.00 -1201 -201 -115 -156 -138 -138 -138
East Babergh - 1653 18387 -32 -1.80 -353 -52 -12 -16 -56 -56 -14
East Ipswich - 4079 29624 -171 -3.94 -1243 -318 -29 -66 -155 -217 -217
East Mid Suffolk Winner 1836 18314 105 5.33 1043 86 123 91 102 109 109
East St Albans - 3940 26952 -52 -1.22 -355 -118 13 90 -54 -253 -254
East Welwyn Hatfiel... Winner 3774 32042 306 7.14 2597 118 485 424 291 193 193
East East Hertfords... Winner 3564 24666 384 9.68 2657 249 515 457 484 484 484
East Stevenage Loser 2657 30689 -327 -11.91 -3773 -429 -228 -232 -319 -392 -392
East East Suffolk Loser 4871 20024 -234 -4.69 -963 -308 -162 -262 -143 -143 -286
East West Suffolk - 4964 28105 52 1.00 293 12 91 -0 69 69 72
East Somerset West ... - 3132 21054 -115 -3.45 -771 -159 -71 -65 -112 -115 -145
London City of London - 59418 8885599 393 0.60 58760 -602 1373 -488 -1077 -883 -993
London Barking &Dagen... Loser 3621 17829 -467 -13.08 -2299 -534 -401 -452 -414 -426 -391
London Barnet - 8237 21746 -264 -2.95 -696 -402 -127 -144 -214 -209 -209
London Bexley Loser 6024 24853 -676 -10.91 -2788 -886 -472 -653 -710 -710 -710
London Brent Loser 8306 25680 -722 -8.14 -2233 -879 -569 -431 -939 -939 -939
London Bromley Winner 7224 22207 322 4.09 990 168 473 417 287 340 387
London Camden - 28348 116258 1132 3.44 4642 262 1979 1747 502 229 680
London Croydon Loser 8561 22525 -680 -7.57 -1789 -912 -453 -404 -831 -879 -879
London Ealing Loser 9366 27204 -1283 -13.16 -3726 -1502 -1069 -1037 -1454 -1454 -1389
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Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
London Enfield Loser 7077 21528 -305 -4.11 -929 -348 -263 -301 -303 -319 -359
London Greenwich - 5022 18292 -106 -1.99 -384 -137 -74 -52 -162 -198 -198
London Hackney Winner 6622 24651 474 6.18 1765 358 588 551 441 439 1002
London Hammersmith &F... - 9588 52628 -208 -1.99 -1140 -489 67 -306 456 75 75
London Haringey Loser 4232 15776 -669 -15.88 -2493 -716 -622 -697 -596 -611 -611
London Harrow Loser 5034 20396 -417 -7.92 -1690 -541 -296 -286 -399 -456 -467
London Havering - 5225 20952 -120 -2.16 -483 -207 -35 -57 -227 -152 -144
London Hillingdon Loser 13793 46589 -1487 -10.23 -5023 -1889 -1095 -1076 -1744 -1744 -1769
London Hounslow - 16304 61198 -669 -3.68 -2510 -1481 110 -770 128 -288 -288
London Islington Loser 17759 78059 -2209 -11.49 -9711 -2406 -2014 -1861 -2708 -3195 -3195
London Kensington &Ch... Loser 10183 64210 -1066 -9.92 -6721 -1520 -629 -1413 -887 -887 -887
London Kingston upon ... - 4534 26421 63 1.28 368 1 125 115 35 98 105
London Lambeth Loser 11974 37333 -1881 -14.49 -5865 -2081 -1684 -1511 -2104 -2712 -852
London Lewisham Loser 3913 13264 -578 -14.76 -1960 -630 -527 -523 -620 -559 -559
London Merton Loser 5713 27738 -757 -12.76 -3677 -877 -640 -571 -996 -870 -854
London Newham - 5992 17820 -48 -0.78 -144 -139 41 -186 127 127 126
London Redbridge Loser 4810 16145 -237 -4.73 -796 -302 -174 -248 -264 -204 -213
London Richmond upon ... Winner 6259 32242 713 10.07 3674 586 838 685 755 755 826
London Southwark - 17571 56968 709 3.76 2299 230 1175 46 -145 -145 -145
London Sutton Loser 4067 20348 -145 -3.41 -725 -208 -83 -101 -107 -97 -97
London Tower Hamlets Loser 31190 106151 -2809 -8.23 -9559 -3403 -2225 -2924 -4500 -4500 -5749
London Waltham Forest Loser 4187 15469 -305 -6.93 -1125 -349 -260 -283 -280 -272 -284
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Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
London Wandsworth Loser 7684 24052 -1054 -12.97 -3300 -1157 -953 -907 -875 -887 -875
London Westminster Winner 56957 239268 3034 4.69 12747 2162 3895 2883 111 70 70
South East Medway Winner 4987 18123 144 2.72 523 113 174 79 258 260 259
South East Bracknell Fore... Loser 5219 43782 -273 -5.06 -2294 -344 -204 -190 -309 -295 -254
South East West Berkshire Loser 7373 46825 -365 -4.93 -2318 -468 -264 -493 -267 -267 -267
South East Reading - 7538 46617 -25 -0.32 -154 -115 64 -213 154 160 152
South East Slough Loser 7926 54274 -720 -8.98 -4933 -809 -632 -941 -547 -547 -570
South East Windsor &Maide... - 6633 44734 178 2.48 1199 30 323 57 310 327 180
South East Wokingham Winner 5846 36266 1021 15.20 6332 928 1112 894 1184 1184 1234
South East Milton Keynes Loser 12549 47682 -1087 -7.73 -4129 -1498 -687 -625 -381 -381 -1651
South East Brighton &Hove - 7594 26733 20 0.24 70 -102 140 -32 -0 125 185
South East Portsmouth Loser 5389 25596 -216 -3.91 -1027 -265 -167 -378 -210 -210 -260
South East Southampton Loser 7756 31522 -688 -8.81 -2797 -862 -518 -659 -805 -805 -831
South East Isle of Wight Loser 2505 17923 -381 -15.07 -2723 -407 -355 -360 -390 -390 -390
South East Aylesbury Vale Loser 4286 22760 -77 -1.73 -407 -174 19 -115 -60 -49 -49
South East Chiltern Winner 2440 25776 222 8.19 2346 167 276 253 175 190 190
South East South Bucks Loser 2282 32926 -170 -7.27 -2448 -203 -137 -150 -148 -144 -144
South East Wycombe Loser 5423 31018 -526 -9.73 -3010 -581 -472 -496 -498 -498 -493
South East Eastbourne - 1666 16301 -9 -0.50 -86 -29 12 -21 3 3 3
South East Hastings - 1438 15641 -40 -2.66 -434 -59 -21 -16 -57 -63 -24
South East Lewes - 1764 17483 -92 -5.04 -908 -134 -51 -51 -135 -165 -165
South East Rother Loser 1272 13649 -160 -12.52 -1718 -183 -138 -126 -133 -207 -201
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Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
South East Wealden Loser 2420 15435 -99 -3.99 -632 -138 -61 -67 -218 -217 -217
South East Basingstoke &D... - 6762 38786 152 2.14 869 -28 326 4 217 217 217
South East East Hampshire - 2368 19950 -18 -0.74 -153 -79 41 16 40 11 45
South East Eastleigh Loser 3876 30052 -255 -6.06 -1973 -348 -163 -217 -332 -230 -230
South East Fareham Loser 2746 23841 -465 -15.37 -4040 -615 -322 -375 -417 -417 -248
South East Gosport Loser 955 11268 -39 -3.87 -462 -60 -19 -34 -32 -41 -48
South East Hart Loser 3445 36496 -500 -13.75 -5294 -573 -428 -410 -483 -510 -549
South East Havant Loser 2956 24009 -559 -19.46 -4541 -606 -513 -577 -571 -571 -560
South East New Forest Winner 3905 21782 168 4.01 937 28 303 224 158 157 228
South East Rushmoor Winner 3185 33468 104 2.95 1092 69 138 140 128 105 102
South East Test Valley Loser 3129 25784 -226 -6.86 -1861 -276 -177 -191 -190 -217 -214
South East Winchester Loser 5001 41081 -493 -9.23 -4050 -533 -453 -396 -580 -594 -584
South East Ashford Loser 2845 22935 -228 -7.57 -1834 -262 -194 -151 -288 -293 -293
South East Canterbury Loser 3106 19453 -209 -6.50 -1311 -238 -180 -229 -214 -215 -207
South East Dartford Loser 3682 35564 -380 -9.81 -3670 -472 -290 -276 -407 -397 -487
South East Dover Loser 2451 21605 -201 -8.18 -1775 -250 -154 -200 -246 -197 -197
South East Gravesham - 1510 14284 -20 -1.26 -193 -38 -3 -23 -8 -24 -25
South East Maidstone - 3777 23028 -129 -3.18 -786 -174 -85 -82 -93 -108 -216
South East Sevenoaks Winner 3498 29603 181 4.84 1530 110 250 91 293 293 296
South East Folkestone &Hy... Winner 1989 18108 64 3.05 583 27 100 75 63 62 62
South East Swale - 2507 17597 -32 -1.23 -227 -144 75 15 -31 -39 -39
South East Thanet - 1938 13860 -26 -1.27 -186 -42 -10 -11 -26 -26 -26
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South East Tonbridge &Mal... - 3806 30259 -63 -1.56 -499 -93 -33 -13 -7 -0 -25
South East Tunbridge Well... Loser 3463 29697 -260 -7.42 -2232 -351 -172 -110 -152 -174 -174
South East Cherwell Loser 4621 31748 -401 -8.50 -2758 -462 -342 -346 -378 -378 -373
South East Oxford Loser 6081 39304 -889 -14.46 -5746 -1022 -759 -898 -680 -690 -690
South East South Oxfordsh... Loser 4125 29853 -538 -12.83 -3897 -604 -474 -515 -538 -538 -548
South East Vale of White ... Loser 3877 30640 -104 -2.58 -818 -184 -25 -151 -61 -61 -59
South East West Oxfordshi... Loser 2381 21923 -322 -12.93 -2962 -395 -250 -328 -362 -329 -211
South East Elmbridge - 5324 39321 -604 -10.20 -4458 -968 -259 -336 -908 -937 -937
South East Epsom &Ewell Loser 1716 21871 -161 -9.46 -2047 -200 -122 -163 -118 -130 -127
South East Guildford Loser 4983 34352 -564 -11.30 -3887 -641 -488 -490 -539 -601 -601
South East Mole Valley Loser 4007 46069 -589 -14.87 -6766 -740 -442 -742 -459 -459 -459
South East Reigate &Banst... Loser 7071 49175 -1263 -19.38 -8783 -1462 -1070 -1258 -1302 -1302 -1302
South East Runnymede - 5306 62429 118 2.00 1385 -51 282 -139 305 246 250
South East Spelthorne Loser 2948 29954 -47 -1.52 -476 -101 7 -59 -60 -91 -91
South East Surrey Heath - 3218 36409 64 1.92 727 -20 146 6 107 87 233
South East Tandridge Loser 1865 21708 -305 -16.31 -3550 -351 -260 -260 -376 -376 -287
South East Waverley Loser 3287 26506 -307 -9.52 -2475 -381 -235 -296 -260 -260 -220
South East Woking Loser 3340 33077 -337 -9.71 -3336 -475 -204 -313 -570 -570 -570
South East Adur - 1089 17143 -7 -0.59 -103 -30 17 2 -36 -4 14
South East Arun Loser 2142 13749 -52 -2.27 -333 -87 -17 -44 -35 -36 -35
South East Chichester - 3165 26871 -28 -0.86 -235 -76 20 -21 34 8 12
South East Crawley - 5589 50403 -89 -1.50 -802 -259 77 -4 -134 -149 -149
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South East Horsham - 3000 22017 -12 -0.38 -87 -120 93 48 55 55 -81
South East Mid Sussex Loser 3156 21621 -193 -5.96 -1319 -220 -165 -139 -245 -243 -261
South East Worthing Winner 3222 29750 213 6.20 1963 60 359 246 182 202 331
South West Bath &North Ea... Loser 4056 22009 -281 -6.76 -1526 -348 -215 -239 -329 -329 -329
South West Bristol, City ... - 13120 29114 105 0.74 233 -47 255 -11 -28 -168 -139
South West North Somerset Winner 4098 19520 50 1.13 239 -30 129 94 104 13 37
South West South Gloucest... - 10386 37912 -6 -0.06 -24 -191 176 -132 -484 -333 -398
South West Plymouth - 5032 19251 -88 -1.67 -336 -145 -31 -187 -103 -103 -103
South West Torbay Loser 2008 15008 -229 -11.32 -1715 -273 -187 -205 -247 -247 -251
South West Swindon Loser 9242 42476 -906 -9.33 -4163 -1042 -772 -814 -869 -902 -916
South West Cornwall Winner 9633 17506 310 2.99 564 219 401 315 236 226 226
South West Isles of Scill... Loser 68 29122 -2 -3.41 -1010 -5 0 -3 -1 -0 -0
South West Wiltshire Loser 10901 22316 -246 -2.14 -504 -464 -32 -431 -58 -58 -68
South West Bournemouth, C... - 9456 24191 122 1.22 311 33 210 136 145 94 145
South West Dorset - 7301 19646 241 3.14 650 92 388 184 397 397 421
South West East Devon Winner 2468 17835 66 2.55 477 -1 132 79 90 90 35
South West Exeter - 4977 39601 5 0.10 43 -82 92 -29 39 36 17
South West Mid Devon - 1184 14878 23 1.86 290 5 41 29 18 21 25
South West North Devon - 2067 21952 14 0.66 152 -9 37 13 15 13 13
South West South Hams - 1920 22619 -20 -0.98 -233 -57 17 -31 9 9 -1
South West Teignbridge Loser 2177 16889 -143 -6.18 -1111 -197 -91 -102 -140 -140 -158
South West Torridge Loser 894 13482 -17 -1.86 -260 -32 -2 -24 -18 -14 -13
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South West West Devon - 751 13779 -27 -3.47 -495 -44 -11 -16 -14 -23 -23
South West Cheltenham Loser 3047 26134 -474 -15.39 -4068 -631 -325 -441 -568 -642 -312
South West Cotswold Winner 2983 34869 330 10.00 3859 272 387 356 307 331 290
South West Forest of Dean Loser 1540 18208 -227 -14.39 -2690 -312 -147 -264 -149 -149 -149
South West Gloucester Loser 3255 25596 -334 -10.28 -2626 -393 -275 -268 -235 -286 -285
South West Stroud Winner 2257 19328 181 7.31 1550 119 242 195 205 172 210
South West Tewkesbury Loser 2714 31243 -392 -14.11 -4509 -483 -303 -345 -387 -387 -438
South West Mendip - 2058 18366 -21 -0.95 -184 -44 2 14 -61 -62 21
South West Sedgemoor Winner 2112 17579 281 11.95 2341 252 310 248 356 363 363
South West South Somerset Loser 3261 19703 -263 -7.72 -1586 -315 -211 -239 -289 -289 -289
Wales Isle of Angles... Winner 908 12975 59 6.02 850 26 92 75 52 52 52
Wales Gwynedd - 2539 20665 -84 -3.23 -688 -133 -37 -30 -69 -58 -186
Wales Conwy Winner 1736 14937 48 2.55 415 5 90 58 59 60 60
Wales Denbighshire - 1650 17425 1 0.04 7 -36 37 -4 10 -24 -24
Wales Flintshire Loser 3419 22191 -84 -2.40 -548 -125 -45 -84 -23 -23 -68
Wales Wrexham Loser 3038 22232 -71 -2.29 -522 -121 -23 -104 -65 -45 -39
Wales Ceredigion - 1297 17376 -17 -1.32 -231 -49 14 -26 -12 -11 33
Wales Pembrokeshire Loser 2175 17616 -92 -4.16 -746 -198 9 -80 -60 -60 -60
Wales Carmarthenshir... Loser 2944 15903 -54 -1.77 -293 -93 -16 -94 -4 -1 -5
Wales Swansea Loser 5039 20789 -283 -5.32 -1169 -356 -212 -330 -244 -245 -201
Wales Neath Port Tal... Winner 2271 16107 216 8.65 1533 129 300 214 260 258 260
Wales Bridgend - 2919 20543 13 0.42 93 -38 64 53 19 -20 -28
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Wales Vale of Glamor... - 2363 18520 -158 -6.30 -1235 -249 -69 -204 -91 -89 -60
Wales Cardiff - 10576 29611 358 3.21 1003 267 449 163 581 562 589
Wales Rhondda Cynon ... Loser 3600 15164 -375 -10.30 -1581 -406 -345 -420 -343 -349 -338
Wales Caerphilly - 2699 14981 -67 -2.36 -371 -118 -16 -22 -83 -65 -125
Wales Blaenau Gwent Winner 812 11676 39 4.49 555 15 62 47 20 31 55
Wales Torfaen Loser 1488 16203 -67 -4.40 -726 -92 -41 -71 -39 -39 -52
Wales Monmouthshire Loser 2020 21844 -99 -4.73 -1068 -141 -57 -65 -85 -85 -84
Wales Newport Winner 3394 22968 356 9.51 2406 287 422 401 341 341 341
Wales Powys Loser 2206 16631 -90 -4.02 -676 -151 -30 -107 -84 -84 -52
Wales Merthyr Tydfil Loser 989 16671 -56 -5.38 -936 -82 -30 -42 -78 -78 -41
Scotland Clackmannanshi... Loser 948 18458 -124 -11.96 -2416 -146 -103 -79 -118 -112 -112
Scotland Dumfries &Gall... Loser 2763 18461 -55 -1.89 -368 -99 -12 -48 -29 -27 -37
Scotland East Ayrshire Loser 1553 12723 -77 -4.80 -629 -101 -53 -62 -48 -48 -48
Scotland East Lothian - 1584 15371 -29 -1.70 -281 -56 -2 -43 -23 -22 3
Scotland East Renfrewsh... - 986 10609 -55 -5.20 -589 -99 -13 -53 -60 -60 5
Scotland Na h-Eileanan ... Loser 546 20170 -32 -5.69 -1168 -43 -20 -39 -8 -15 -58
Scotland Falkirk - 3682 23236 1 0.04 9 -76 77 -42 -16 -16 -16
Scotland Fife Loser 7159 19450 -727 -9.94 -1974 -821 -633 -634 -765 -807 -966
Scotland Highland - 5909 25240 -31 -0.51 -134 -128 64 -175 70 70 25
Scotland Inverclyde Loser 1266 15925 -225 -18.12 -2826 -265 -186 -210 -228 -228 -235
Scotland Midlothian - 1447 16558 -71 -4.47 -811 -135 -10 -42 17 17 -87
Scotland Moray - 2030 21254 -21 -0.98 -216 -64 22 -71 58 5 -5
23
Table A5: District Level Estimates of the Economic Cost of the Brexit-vote Across 382 districts in 2018 relative to 2015
Real Gross Value Added
District GVA in 2015 yˆENSd ensemble other estimates
Region LA Type £million capita £million % capita Low High ENSsim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
Scotland North Ayrshire Loser 1954 14354 -130 -6.56 -958 -164 -98 -140 -140 -140 -140
Scotland Orkney Islands Loser 628 28980 -85 -13.49 -3905 -111 -60 -71 -107 -107 -69
Scotland Perth &Kinross Loser 4320 28813 -495 -11.24 -3299 -566 -425 -558 -469 -471 -471
Scotland Scottish Borde... - 1893 16601 -3 -0.16 -29 -37 30 26 33 16 16
Scotland Shetl&Islands Loser 794 34224 -154 -19.86 -6628 -173 -135 -161 -131 -142 -142
Scotland South Ayrshire - 1847 16432 6 0.29 49 -32 42 21 -6 -28 132
Scotland South Lanarksh... Loser 5153 16295 -157 -2.92 -498 -224 -91 -192 -93 -86 -174
Scotland Stirling - 2483 26748 15 0.58 160 -36 65 21 42 7 12
Scotland Aberdeen City Loser 11351 49277 -2062 -18.19 -8951 -2445 -1690 -2802 -3043 -3043 -1155
Scotland Aberdeenshire Loser 7381 28176 -1322 -17.00 -5047 -1467 -1180 -1288 -1710 -1406 -946
Scotland Argyll &Bute Loser 1802 20739 -91 -4.88 -1048 -125 -58 -121 -49 -67 -67
Scotland City of Edinbu... Winner 21294 42690 1393 6.03 2792 1076 1705 1130 1346 1469 1469
Scotland Renfrewshire Loser 3874 22193 -309 -7.64 -1773 -379 -241 -269 -251 -251 -362
Scotland West Dunbarton... - 1566 17480 -58 -3.47 -643 -89 -27 -52 -65 -35 -42
Scotland West Lothian - 4571 25601 -177 -3.73 -993 -273 -83 -1 -153 -179 -241
Scotland Angus Loser 1953 16707 -302 -15.13 -2584 -342 -263 -305 -273 -273 -306
Scotland Dundee City Loser 3426 23116 -101 -2.87 -680 -171 -32 -162 -37 -37 -25
Scotland North Lanarksh... - 6756 19973 -373 -4.99 -1102 -525 -223 -138 -378 -361 -378
Scotland East Dunbarton... - 1281 11976 -2 -0.17 -23 -45 38 26 -3 -3 -3
Scotland Glasgow City - 18830 31055 -156 -0.79 -257 -367 53 -151 -297 -297 5
N Ireland Antrim &Newtow... - 2835 20183 -77 -2.57 -549 -118 -37 -54 -34 -34 -64
N Ireland Armagh City, B... - 3324 15996 13 0.34 61 -37 61 76 -85 11 -29
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N Ireland Belfast - 11932 35207 160 1.24 472 14 305 301 84 84 267
N Ireland Causeway Coast... - 1960 13692 -14 -0.66 -97 -67 38 21 -27 -25 -25
N Ireland Derry City &St... Winner 2303 15407 202 8.04 1352 165 238 199 224 224 205
N Ireland Fermanagh &Oma... - 1968 17067 -30 -1.42 -260 -65 5 17 -37 -43 -48
N Ireland Lisburn &Castl... - 3010 21469 -6 -0.20 -46 -71 57 -0 3 3 28
N Ireland Mid &East Antr... Loser 4402 32097 -1720 -51.31 -12541 -1939 -1512 -1596 -1803 -1776 -1815
N Ireland Mid Ulster Winner 2676 18583 268 8.83 1859 189 344 340 227 230 227
N Ireland Newry, Mourne ... Loser 2625 14884 -125 -4.47 -710 -170 -81 -95 -99 -90 -85
N Ireland Ards &North Do... Winner 1764 11109 41 2.12 257 6 75 73 50 22 22
Yorkshire& ... Kingston upon ... - 5773 22325 -144 -2.40 -556 -237 -52 -39 -161 -179 -181
Yorkshire& ... East Riding of... - 6299 18705 -134 -2.00 -397 -248 -21 29 -75 -71 -66
Yorkshire& ... North East Lin... Loser 3119 19497 -454 -14.53 -2839 -487 -422 -422 -438 -423 -533
Yorkshire& ... North Lincolns... - 3726 21938 -81 -2.07 -479 -160 -5 18 -146 -146 -7
Yorkshire& ... York - 5759 27986 132 2.18 643 -71 329 81 367 367 367
Yorkshire& ... Craven Winner 1276 22857 89 6.31 1601 71 107 85 96 85 85
Yorkshire& ... Hambleton Loser 2134 23692 -112 -5.09 -1247 -175 -51 -76 -122 -122 -111
Yorkshire& ... Harrogate Winner 3758 23500 82 2.00 514 -8 170 152 -47 -47 -47
Yorkshire& ... Richmondshire Winner 757 14401 32 4.04 618 13 51 24 52 52 52
Yorkshire& ... Ryedale - 1156 21676 -34 -2.68 -642 -83 13 -24 -37 -37 6
Yorkshire& ... Scarborough - 1864 17245 62 3.16 571 36 87 46 97 97 96
Yorkshire& ... Selby - 1974 22896 -2 -0.10 -24 -47 42 35 -39 -39 48
Yorkshire& ... Barnsley - 3550 14801 52 1.38 219 11 93 47 95 95 106
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Yorkshire& ... Doncaster Winner 5227 17110 623 10.37 2039 569 676 773 600 604 602
Yorkshire& ... Rotherham Loser 4636 17767 -252 -5.24 -967 -324 -182 -256 -331 -329 -331
Yorkshire& ... Sheffield Loser 12041 21155 -343 -2.79 -603 -538 -151 -571 -176 -176 -188
Yorkshire& ... Bradford - 9019 17021 -167 -1.81 -316 -276 -60 -168 -256 -188 -256
Yorkshire& ... Calderdale Loser 4581 22042 -798 -16.25 -3842 -942 -658 -507 -954 -954 -852
Yorkshire& ... Kirklees - 6929 16008 20 0.27 45 -48 87 45 48 42 48
Yorkshire& ... Leeds - 24009 31051 -62 -0.24 -80 -185 61 -239 107 107 125
Yorkshire& ... Wakefield Winner 6712 20095 216 3.07 647 97 333 284 89 151 151
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Table A6: Correlation between 2016 % Leave support and the estimated loss in GVA by
2018 relative to 2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
implied by “best synthetic control”
Ensemble Ensemblesim AAPEs RMSPEs MAPEs
% Leave in 2016 Referendum -0.091* -0.079 -0.099* -0.099** -0.087*
(0.049) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.050)
Mean of DV -2.9 -2.32 -2.63 -2.66 -2.8
R2 .0971 .112 .0876 .0961 .0944
Local authority districts 381 381 381 381 381
Notes: All regressions include NUTS1 region shifters. The dependent variable is the ensemble estimate
of the output gap in percent relative to 2015. The ensemble has been constructed from 31 synthetic
controls constructed using different sets of donor pools. Support for Leave is estimated in percentage
points. Robust standard errors are provided in the parentheses. Stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
and * p < 0.1.
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